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BUSINESS VISITORS AND INVITEESt
By WILLiAm L. PRossR*
T a Restatement of the Law of Torts of the American Law
Institute, under the general heading of "Liability for Con-
dition and Use of Land," offers the following definitions:
"Sec. 330. Licensee Defined. A licensee is a person who is
privileged to enter or remain upon hInd by virtue of the possessor's
consent, whether given by invitation or permission.
"Sec. 331. Gratuitous Licensee Defined. A gratuitous li-
censee is any licensee other than a business visitor as defined in
Sec. 332.
"Sec. 332. Business Visitor Defined. A business visitor is
a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on land
in the possession of another for a purpose directly or indirectly
connected with business dealings between them."
The import of these definitions is made clear by reference to
later sections of the Restatement, which declare that toward a
gratuitous licensee there is no duty on the part of the man in
possession other than to exercise reasonable care in the conduct
of his activities, and to disclose dangerous conditions on the land
so far as they are known to him;' but that toward a business
visitor he is under the additional obligation of affirmative care
in inspecting and preparing the premises so that they will be in
safe condition for his reception.2 The difference is one of "busi-
ness dealings," and a business visitor is one whose visit "is or
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
tAlso published in the Canadian Bar Review.
XSec. 342, comment c: "A possessor of land owes to a gratuitous li-
censee no duty to prepare a safe place for the licensee's reception, or to
inspect the land to discover possible or even probable dangers. If the
license is gratuitous, the privilege to enter is a gift, and the licensee, as
the recipient thereof, is entitled to expect nothing more than a disclosure
of the conditions which he will meet if he acts upon the license and enters,
in so far as those conditions are known to the giver of the privilege."
2 Sec. 343.
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may be financially beneficial to the possessor," while "he has no
financial interest in the entry of a gratuitous licensee."
It will be observed that the Restatement of Torts has dis-
carded the term "invitee," which is in common use by the courts,
and that whether the visitor enters by invitation or by bare per-
mission, the test is one of pecuniary interest in his presence.
The Explanatory Notes of the Reporter 4 make it clear that "in-
vitation" was jettisoned deliberately. The theory adopted is that
which has been advocated elsewhere in the reporter's own
writings,5 that the duty of affirmative care to make the premises
safe is the price which the man in possession must pay for the
economic benefit, present or prospective, to be derived from the
visitor's presence, and that when no such benefit is to be found,
he is under no such duty. This theory apparently has been ac-
cepted by several of the learned authors of treatises on torts.0 It is
the purpose of this article to inquire whether it is, or ever has
been, the law of England or of the United States.
It is interesting to compare with the Restatement a recent de-
cision of the supreme court of Kansas.7 The defendant operated a
corner lunch room and cigar store in the business section of the
city of Wichita, at which the plaintiff had been an habitual
customer for a number of years. On the occasion in question he
entered the premises with no intention of making any purchase,
loitered in the front part of the building for fifteen or twenty
minutes, and then went to make use of a toilet in the back hall-
way, where he was injured by falling through an open trap door
in the floor. The toilet was used customarily, with the consent of
the defendant, not only by customers but also by the public in
general; it was understood to be open to the public, and the plain-
tiff had made use of it "about every day he had been in town."
The court held-and surely quite properly-that the plaintiff was
aSec. 343, Comment a.4Explanatory Notes to Restatement of the Law of Torts, Tentative
Draft No. 4 (1929) Commentary to sec. 202, pp. 16-18.
5Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort.
(1905) 44 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 209, 227; Bohlen, The Duty of a Land-
owner Towards Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right, (1920)
69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 142, 340, 342.
6Salmond, Law of Torts (8th ed. 1934) 510; Winfield, Law of Tort
(1937) 590; Harper, Law of Torts (1933) 255; Charlesworth, Law of
Negligence (1938) 163. In contrast is the careful review of the cases in
1 Beven, Negligence (4th ed. 1928) 570-579, which seems to prefer the
theory of invitation.
7Campbell v. Weathers, (1941) 153 Kan. 316, 111 P. (2d) 72.
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an "invitee" toward whom the defendant owed a duty of reason-
able care to see that the hallway was safe.
There was, of course, no profit to be made out of the plaintiff
on this particular visit, for he bought nothing and intended to
buy nothing. Made uneasy" by talk of economic benefit, the court
labored hard to find something of the sort, suggesting advertis-
ing and goodwill, and the possibility that he might have become
interested in some new brand of cigar on display and purchased
it then or on some future occasion. But this, of course, might
be equally likely in the case of any friend of the plaintiff entering
to wait for him, any loafer coming in to get out of the rain, or
even a policeman seeking to arrest the proprietor; in fact, it is
not easy to conceive of any visitor to whom it might not apply. If
that is what is meant by "business dealings" and "financial inter-
est," then all who enter any retail shop are to be classed as "busi-
ness visitors."
The case illustrates the uncertainties which surround the test
of pecuniary advantage. Instead of a cigar store, suppose that the
toilet had been located in a railway station: would the court
have considered seriously the chance that the visitor might be
attracted by the sight of a train and induced to take a ride?
No doubt it may be assumed that there is potential profit to be
found in the case of a customer entering a store with an unful-
filled intention to buy,' or one who forms that intention after
entering,10 or one who is "shopping" in the hope of finding
something that she wants," or even one with the "vague purpose
of buying something if she saw anything she took a fancy to."' 2
8
"Of course, if it appears a person had no intention of presently or in
the future becoming a customer he could not be held to be an imitee as
there would be no basis for any thought of mutual benefit. 45 C. J. 812, sec.
221 and cases cited.' 111 P. (2d) 76.
sWilliamson v. Neitzel, (1927) 45 Idaho 39, 260 Pac. 689; Greenley v.
Miller's, (1930) 111 Corn. 584, 150 At. 500; Huber v. American Drug
Stores, (1932) 19 La. App. 430, 140 So. 120; Smith v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., (Mo. App. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d) 414; Dunham v. Hubert W. White,
Inc., (1938) 203 'Mim. 82, 279 N. W. 839. Cf. Sch\\artzman v. Lloyd,(1936) 65 App. D. C. 216, 82 F. (2d) 822 (waiting in front of door before
opening).
i0Braun v. Vallade, (1917) 33 Cal. App. 279, 164 Pac. 904.
i1j. G. Christopher Co. v. Russell, (1912) 63 Fla. 191, 58 So. 45,
Ann. Cas. 1913C 564; Finnegan v. The Goerke Co., (1929) 106 N. J. L.
59, 147 Adt. 442; Dickey v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., (1929) 157 Md. 448.
146 Adt. 282; Nelson v. F. W. Woolworth Co., (1930) 211 Iowa 592, 231
N. W. 665.
22McDonough v. F. W. Woolworth Co., (1918) 91 N. J. L. 677, 103
Adt. 74. Cf. Rasmussen v. National Tea Co., (1940) 304 11. App. 353,
26 N. E. (2d) 523 (inquiring about future rummage sale).
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But what of the child too young to buy at all, brought along in its
mother's arms, or the man who merely wants change for a
quarter, or desires to use the telephone? What of the million
tourists who annually have visited Mr. Henry Ford's plant at
River Rouge, most of them without any idea of ever buying a
Ford? Suppose that a department store gives a free Christmas
party, and invites the children of the town? Are not all of these
invited, present by reason of a public invitation, and entitled to
protection-and yet does the remote and optimistic hope of "busi-
ness" play any real part in distinguishing them from the barest
of licensees? And if so, what are we to do with the visitor at a
free public lecture, or the public library, the public comfort sta-
tion, and the municipal playground?
Evidently something is buried deeper here, and the "busi-
ness visitor," if we are to call him that, requires something in
the way of definition other than what the Restatement has of-
fered. It is well to begin with the early cases, to determine what
part the ideas of "invitation" and "business interest" have played
in the decisions, and how far they have diverged from one another.
HISTORY
Although there is some early authority13 distinguishing between
a paying "guest" at an inn and a gratuitous lodger, as in a
private home, the modern law may be said to begin with Parnaby
v. Lancaster Canal Co.24 in 1839. The defendants operated a
canal, from which they failed to remove a sunken obstruction, with
resulting damage to the boat of the plaintiff, who paid for the
privilege of passing through. The opinion of Chief Justice Tindal
(with italics supplied by this writer) states the reason for lia-
bility as follows:
"... the facts stated in the inducement shew that the coin-
pany made the canal for their profit, and opened it to the public
upon payment of tolls to the company; and the common law, in
such a case, imposes a duty upon the proprietors . . . to take
reasonable care, so long as they keep it open for the public use
of all who may choose to navigate it, that they may navigate it
without danger to their lives or property. We concur with the
Court of Queen's Bench in thinking that a duty of this nature
is imposed upon the company, and that they are responsible for
the breach of it upon a similar principle to that which makes a
shopkeeper, who invites the public to his shop, liable for neglect
131 Rolle Abr. 3; Cayle's Case, (1584) 4 Co. 32a; Gelley v. Clark.
(1607) Cro. Jac. 188; Yorke v. Grenaugh, (1703) 2 Ld. Rayni. 868.
14(1839) 11 Ad. & El. 223.
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on leaving a trap door open without any protection, by which his
customers suffer injury."
Here is mention of economic benefit in the form of tolls, upon
which Professor Bohlen has seized;1 but is the mention more
than casual and incidental? Is not the basis of the decision rather
that the canal was thrown open to the public, and that by a very
obvious analogy to a common carrier, the defendant had assumed
a duty toward any rhember of the public who might use it pursuant
to the invitation given?
Seventeen years later came Southcote z. Stanley,10 where the
plaintiff came to an inn on a private visit to the innkeeper, ap-
parently of a pfirely social character, and was injured by a piece
of glass falling out of a door. He was denied recovery on the
ground that he must take the premises as he found them and
assume the risk of conditions unknown to the occupier. It is
here that the word "business" first made its appearance, in a
casual and rather confused remark of Baron Alderson in the
course of argument of counsel:
"The case of a shop is different, because a shop is open to the
public; and there is a distinction between persons who come on
business and those who come by invitation.""7
Virtually the same words were repeated two years later by Erle,
J., in Chapman v. Rothwell,2s where a customer was injured in
a brewery:
"The distinction is between the case of a visitor (as the plain-
tiff was in Southcote v. Stanley), who must take care of himself.
and a customer who, as one of the public, is invited for the pur-
poses of business carried on by the defendant."
Now what does this mean? The inn, like the shop or the
brewery, was of course open to the public; but the plaintiff did
not come for the purpose for which it was thus thrown open.
No doubt he was "invited," but his invitation was a private and
not a public one, and he did not share in the duty which the inn-
3.5Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort,
(1905) 44 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 209, 227. It is of interest to compare with
the quotation given above the author's statement of the decision: ". . . it
was held that since the company had made the canal for their profit, and
opened it upon payment of tolls to the company, the common law imposed
on them a duty to take reasonable care so long as they keep it open for the
use of all who choose to navigate it, that 'they may navigate it without
danger of their lives and property . . . upon a similar principle to that
which makes a shopowner liable for neglect in leaving a trap door open
by which his customer suffers injury.' . . :'
16(1856) 1 H. & N. 247, 24 L. J. Ex. 339.
l7Italics supplied.
18(1858) 1 E. B. & E. 168. Italics again supplied.
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keeper, as such, assumed toward the public. Read in the light of
its context, does "business" refer to anything more or less than
the purpose for which the public, as distinct from any private
visitor, had been invited to come? This interpretation is borne
out by a case'" arising ten years later, in which the plaintiff
came to an inn merely to meet a friend by appointment-a pur-
pose for which the inn undoubtedly was open to anyone-and
was permitted to recover as a "guest." Since Southcote v. Stanley
it has gone undisputed that a private social visitor, although he
may have been invited and even urged to come, is merely a
licensee, entitled to no affirmative care to prepare the premises
for his reception.20 There is no line of cases which has done so
much to discredit the idea of "invitation" as a basis of liability.
Next in order is Corby v. Hill.2' The plaintiff was upon a
road leading from the highway to a public lunatic asylum for the
purpose of a visit, the nature of which is not stated, to the
asylum superintendent. He was injured by driving in the dark
into a pile of slates left on the road without a light. The opinion
of Chief Justice Cockburn gives the first hint of the underlying
theory of liability:
"The proprietors of the soil held out an allurement whereby
the plaintiff was induced to come upon the place in question;
they held out this road to all persons having occasion to proceed
to the asylum as the means of access thereto. . . . Having, so to
speak, dedicated the way to such of the general public as might
have occasion to use it for that purpose, and having held it out
as a safe and convenient mode of access to the establishment,
without any reservation, it was not competent for them to place
thereon any obstruction calculated to render the road unsafe, and
likely to cause injury to those persons to whom they had held out
as a way along which they might safely go."
Here is no word of benefit or hope of advantage, nor indeed
'9Axford v. Prior, (1866) 14 W. R. 611.20Greenfield v. Miller, (1921) 173 Wis. 184, 180 N. W. 834, 12
A. L. R. 982; Comeau v. Comeau, (1933) 285 Mass. 578, 189 N. E. 585,
92 A. L. R. 1002; Page v. Murphy, (1935) 194 Minn. 607, 261 N. W. 443;
McCulloch v. Horton, (1936) 102 Mont. 135, 56 P. (2d) 1344; Gregory v.
Loder, (1936) 116 N. J. L. 451, 185 Atl. 360; Lewis v. Dear, (1938) 120
N. J. L. 244, 198 AUt. 887; Cosgrave v. Malstrom, (N. J. 1941) 23 A.
(2d) 288. The only case found to the contrary is Lynch v. McDermott,
(1933) 111 N. J. L. 216, 168 AtI. 192, which would appear to be overruled
by the last three cases cited. See Note, (1934) 14 Boston U. L. Rev. 695.
21(1858) 4 C. B. (N.S.) 556, 27 L. J. C. P. 318. For the sake of
brevity, the alternative basis of liability suggested by the other opinions,
that the defendant had "set a trap" for the plaintiff, is omitted from con-
sideration. The actual defendant in the case, of course, was the contractor
who left the slates on the road.
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does any appear in the case. It is the "holding out" of a road to
a public building as suitable for public use, the implied repre-
sentation that it is safe, and the entry of the plaintiff in reliance
on that representation, which makes the occupier responsible.
Indermaur v. Dames22 in 1866, which usually is regarded as
the leading case, is in fact sixth in the series. It is unique among
the early cases in that it is the only one in which the plaintiff
did not go upon premises open to the public. He was a journey-
man gas-fitter, who was making repairs in the interior of the
defendant's sugar-refining factory. It was in this connection
only that Willes, J., made use of the much quoted words:
cc.*. the capacity in which the plaintiff was there iwas that
of a person on lawful business, in the course of fulfilling a con-
tract in which both the plaintiff and the defendant had an inter-
est, and not upon bare permission."
He did go on to consider the case of a customer in a shop, and
what he said is perhaps significant:
"This protection does not depend upon the fact of a con-
tract being entered into in the way of the shopkeeper's business
during the stay of the customer, but upon the fact that the cus-
tomer has come into the shop in pursuance of a tacit invitation
given by the shopkeeper, with a view to business which concerns
himself. And, if a customer were, after buying goods, to go back
to the shop in order to complain of the quality, or that the
change was not right, he would be just as much there on business
which concerned the shopkeeper, and as much entitled to protec-
tion during this accessory visit, though it might not be for the
shopkeeper's beiefit, as during the principal visit, which was."1=
It is no doubt easy to dismiss this dictum as referring only to
an "accessory" visit, as where the customer returns to pay his
bill,2 4 or to look for a pocketbook left behind;25 but is it at all
clear.that "benefit" to the shopkeeper is the important thing?
Had "business," in 1866, acquired the exclusively commercial
meaning we now give it, or did it still mean to this court only
one's own affairs or concerns, as when we now say, the thing is
my own business and none of yours? Or, in other words, merely
any purpose for which the shop is open and the public invited in?
22(1866) L. R_ 1 C. P. 274, 35 L. J. C. P. 184. aff'd (1867) L. R.
2 C. P. 311, 36 L. J. C. P. 181. See Griffith, Duty of Invitors, (1916) 32
L. Q. Rev. 255.
23Italics supplied.24Hudson v. Church of Holy Trinity, (1929) 250 N. Y. 513, 166 N. E.
306; Ilgenfritz v. Missouri Power & Light Co., (Mo. 1933) 101 S. IV.
(2d) 723; Quinn v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., (1912) 42 Utah 113, 129 Pac.
362, 43 L. R. A. (N.S.) 328.
2SH. L. Green Co. v. Bobbitt, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 281.
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There is little point in pursuing the English cases further in
detail. Typical of the line of development is Smith v. London &
St. Katherine Docks Co.,28 where the plaintiff, having business
with the officer of a ship moored at the defendant's public dock,
was injured while returning to shore over a defective gangway.
Chief Justice Bovill stated the reason for liability as follows:
"... the gangway being provided by the defendants and paid
for by the shipowner, and being for the use of persons having
business on board any such ship, it seems to me to amount to an
invitation by the defendants to such persons to use it . . . being
there on business he met with an accident by reason of his using
what the defendants invited him to use. . . . It seems to me also
that the gangway was held out to the plaintiff as the access to
the ship for all persons having business with the ship. .. ."
The reader, if he cares to do so, may follow the decisions through
for himself.27 There is certainly occasional mention of payment, of
"common interest," of benefit or pecuniary advantage from the
plaintiff's presence, sometimes obviously as a makeweight, some-
times as a reason for saying that the premises were thrown open
to the public. But in every case in which they were thus open, it
will be found that it is the fact that the plaintiff entered as one
of the public, in response to a public invitation, upon a place held
out to the public as safe, which is the essential reason for the
duty imposed. It is only when the entry is upon private premises
for a private purpose that "business dealings" become decisive. 8
When the English and Canadian courts were at last confronted
squarely with the issue of a public invitation without any possi-
bility of economic benefit, in the case of a municipal play-
ground,2 a free public library, 0 and even a railway crossing open
20(1868) L. R. 3 C. P. 326, 37 L. 3. C. P. 217.
27Holmes v. North Eastern R. Co., (1869) L. R. 4 Ex. 254; Francis v.
Cockrell, (1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. 184, 39 L. J. Q. B. 113, aff'd (1870) L. R.
5 Q. B. 501, 39 L. J. Q. B. 291; Watkins v. Great Western R. Co., (1877)
46 L. J. C. P. 817; Thatcher v. Great Western R. Co., (1893) 10 T. L. R.
13; York v. Canada Atlantic S. S. Co., (1893) 22 Can. S. C. Rep. 167;
Miller v. Hancock, [1893] 2 Q. B. 177, 69 L. T. 214; Kennedy v. Shotts
Iron Co., [1913] Sess. Cas. 1143; and see Latham v. Johnson, [19131 1
K. B. 398, 82 L. J. K. B. 262; Mechan v. Watson, [1907] Sess. Cas. 25.28Thus White v. France, (1877) 2 C. P. D. 308, 46 L. J. C. P. 823;
Pritchard v. Peto, [1917] 2 K. B. 173, 86 L. J. K. B. 1292; Bettles v.
Canadian R. R. Co., (1929) 63 Ont. L. Rep. 537; Weigall v. Westminster
Hospital, (1936) 52 T. L. R. 301.29Ellis v. Fulham Borough Council, [1938] 1 K. B. 212, 107 L. J. K. B.
84; McStravick v. City of Ottawa, [1929] 3 Doia. L. Rep. 317, 63 Ont. L.
Rep. 317; Taylor v. Glasgow Corp., [1922] Sess. Cas. 1.
30Nickell v. City of Windsor, [1927] 1 Dom. L. Rep. 379, 59 Ont. L.
Rep. 618.
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for public use,3" it is not surprising, in the light of Corby v. Hill,"
that the plaintiffs were held to be "invitees."
Turning now to the American cases, we find that the earliest
one of consequence is Sweeny v. Old Colony & Newport Rail-
road Co.3 3 in 1865. The defendants had a private crossing over
their railroad, which was not a public highway but had the appear-
ance of one, and had been used by the public, with the defendant's
consent, for a number of years. The plaintiff was run down
while crossing in accordance with a flagman's signal. It was held,
citing Corby v. Hill, that he was not a mere licensee, but that
the defendant had "invited" him to use the crossing:
"The gist of the liability consists in the fact that the person
injured did not act merely for his own convenience and pleasure,
and from motives to which no act or sign of the owner or occu-
pant contributed, but that he entered the premises because he was
led to believe that they were intended to be used by visitors or
passengers, and that such use was not only acquiesced in by the
owner or person in possession and control of the premises, but
that it was in accordance with the intention and design with which
the way or place was adapted and prepared or allowed to be so
used. The true distinction is this: A mere passive acquiescence by
an owner or occupier in a certain use of his land by others in-
volves no liability; but if he directly or by implication induces per-
sons to enter on and pass over his premises, he thereby assumes
an obligation that they are in a safe condition, suitable for such
use. . . . These facts would seem to bring the case within the
principle already stated, that the license to use the crossing had
been used and enjoyed under such circumstances as to amount
to an inducement, held out by the defendants to persons having
occasion to pass, to believe that it was a highway, and to use
it as such."
Next came Gillis v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,3 ' in 1868.
The plaintiff was one of a multitude of spectators who assembled
on the defendant's station platform on an occasion when Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson passed through on a special train. The
defendant apparently had endeavored to keep the president's
arrival secret, in order to prevent detention and confusion. The
plaintiff was injured when the platform gave way. It was held
that he was at most a licensee, since the station was not thrown
open to the public for the purpose for which he came. The court
-
1Mercer v. South Eastern & Chatham R. Co., [1922] 2 K. B. 549, 92
L. J. K. B. 25.
32(1858) 4 C. B. (N.S.) 556, 27 L. J. C. P. 318.
33(1865) 10 Allen (Mass.) 368, 87 Am. Dec. 644.
34(1868) 59 Pa. St. 129, 98 Am. Dec. 317.
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distinguished the case of one who might be there "to welcome a
coming or speed a parting guest,"35 and said:
"I am bound to have the approach to my house sufficient for
all visitors on business or otherwise; but if a crowd gathers
upon it to witness a passing parade and it breaks down, though
it may be shown not to have been sufficient for its ordinary use,
I am not liable to one of the crowd."
Swords v. Edgar,36 in 1874, is next to merit attention. The
defendants owned the south half of a pier in New York harbor,
which they leased to a tenant. The plaintiff's intestate was a long-
shoreman unloading cargo from a steamer, who fell through the
rotten flooring of the pier. He was held to have been "invited."
The pier was likened to an inn; it was "thrown open for entrance
upon, by all persons of the calling of the intestate :"
"Though the pier be private property, and though it be granted
that the owner or occupant thereof might at any time close it and
refuse entrance upon it to any and all persons, yet so long as it
was kept open to that portion of the public of which the intestate
was one, for the profit of the defendant's lessees, there was upon
such lessees primarily, the duty of taking care, so long as it was
thus kept open, that those who had lawful right to go there, could
(1o so without incurring danger to their persons."
Next in order 37 is Beck v. Carter,8 in 1877. The defendant's
hotel adjoined an alley which had been used by the public for a
number of years, as a highway. Such users habitually passed over
a portion of the defendant's lot next to the alley, and the boun-
dary line was not marked out in any -way. A pedestrian who fell
into an excavation on this part of the lot was held to have been
"invited" to come:
"It was not the case of a bare permission by the owner to
cross his land adjoining a public street. The land had, by use long
continued, been made, for the time being, a public place, and
part of the highway."
Finally, in 1880, came Davis v. Central Congregational So-
ciety."9 The defendant religious society held in its meeting-house
a church conference, which all members of every Congregational
church in the vicinity of Boston were invited formally to attend.
35Early cases finding an "invitation" in such a case are Tobin v. Port-
land, S. & P. R. Co., (1871) 59 Me. 183, 8 Am. Rep. 415; Doss v. Mis-
souri, K. & T. R. Co., (1875) 59 Mo. 27, 21 Am. Rep. 371; McKone v.
Michigan Central R. Co., (1883) 51 Mich. 601, 17 N. W. 74, 47 Am.
Rep. 596.
36(1874) 59 N. Y. 28, 17 Am. Rep. 295.
37Omitting one or two cases which add nothing.8(1877) 68 N. Y. 283, 23 Am. Rep. 175.
39(1880) 129 Mass. 367, 37 Am. Rep. 368.
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The plaintiff, a member of one such church, came to the conference
and was injured by falling on an unsafe path leading to the front
door. She was allowed to recover because "she came by the defen-
dant's invitation," and the court said:
"It makes no difference that no pecuniary profit or other bene-
fit was received or expected by the society. The fact that the
plaintiff came by invitation is enough to impose on the defendant
the duty which lies at the foundation of this liability; and that
too although the defendant in giving the invitation was actuated
only by motives of friendship and Christian charity."
Again there is no room to pursue the cases further, and the
reader may follow them for himself.40 It is sufficient to say that in
none of these earlier decisions does "benefit" to the occupier
play any important part, and that in most of them it is entirely
absent. The theory of liability is simply that the defendant has
opened his premises to the public with an invitation to come, and
that the plaintiff has come as one of the public, in reliance upon
an implied representation of safety.
What, then, is the origin of the notion that benefit to the
occupier is the sine qua non of an affirmative duty of care to
make-the premises safe? So far as can be discovered, it seems
to have originated in the mind of the writer of a forgotten
treatise on the law of negligence, Robert Campbell,41 whose first
edition appeared in 1871. Apparently he derived it from the rather
ambiguous language used in Southcote v. Stanley'2 and Smith v.
London & St. Katherine Docks Co.43 In 1880 the Supreme Court
of the United States quoted Campbell in a case" which seems to
4oVanderbeck v. Hendry, (1871) 34 N. J. L. 467; Campbell v. Port-
land Sugar Co., (1873) 62 Me. 552; Pierce v. Whitcomb, (1875) 48 Vt.
126; Pittsburgh, Ft. AV. & C. R. Co. v. Bingham, (1876) 29 Ohio St. 364;
Crogan v. Schiele, (1885) 53 Conn. 186, 1 Ad. 899, 55 Am. Rep. 88;
Hamilton v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., (1885) 64 Tex. 251, 53 Am. Rep. 756;
St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Fairbairn, (1886) 48 Ark. 491, 4 S. W.
50; Larmore v. Crown Point Iron Co., (1886) 101 N. Y. 391, 4 N. E.
752, 54 Am. Rep. 718; Albert v. State to Use of Ryan, (1887) 66 Md.
325, 7 At. 697, 59 Am. Rep. 159; Toomey v. Sanborn. (1888) 146 Mass.
28, 14 N. E. 921; Heinlein v. Boston & P. R. Co., (1888) 147 Mass. 126,
16 N. E. 698, 9 Am. St. Rep. 676; Holmes v. Drew, (1890) 151 Mass.
578, 25 N. E. 22; Stevens v. Nichols, (1892) 155 Mass. 472, 29 N. E.
1150, 15 L. R. A. 459.
4lCampbell, Law of Negligence (2d ed. 1878) 63-64: "The principle
appears to be that initation is inferred where there is a common interest
or mutual advantage, while a license is inferred where the object is the
mere pleasure or benefit of the person using it."
42(1856) 1 H. & N. 247, 24 L. f. Ex. 339.
43(1868) L. R. 3 C. P. 326, 37 L. J. C. P. 217.44Bennett v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., (1880) 102 U. S. 577,
26 L. Ed. 235, 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 349.
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have been decided rather on the basis of public invitation. The
first decision, however, in which the idea of "business" was con-
trolling, was Plummer v. Dill,45 in 1892. The plaintiff came to the
defendant's building in search of her own missing servant-a
purpose, by the way, for which it was of course not thrown open
to the general public. In holding that she was only a licensee,
the Massachusetts court stated the reason thus:
"It is well settled in England that to come under an implied
invitation, as distinguished from a mere license, the visitor must
come for a purpose connected with the business in which the
occupant is engaged, or which he permits to be carried on there.
There must at least be some mutuality of interest in the subject
to which the visitor's business relates, although the particular
thing which is the object of the visit may not be for the benefit of
the occupant."
Even this does not appear very conclusive, in view of the
last qualifying phrase, and the limitation of the opinion to "a
place fitted up for ordinary use in business." And especially in
the light of the court's later reference to "a purpose not con-
nected with the use for which the building was fitted, or to which
it is put," its approval of Davis v. Central Congregational So-
ciety46 as involving an object "among those contemplated by the
defendant when the building was erected," and its acceptance of
cases where a private way is made to look like a street" as based
on an invitation "to come as one of the public and enjoy a
public right." In other words, it is far from clear that the occu-
pier's "business" is intended to mean anything more than the
purpose for which the building was opened.
With this impetus, however, other courts presently began to
insist upon some "business," "interest," "benefit," or "advantage"
on the part of the defendant.4" But parallel with such decisions
were others still relying merely upon a public invitation." In 1905,
45(1892) 156 Mass. 426, 31 N. E. 128, 32 Am. St. Rep. 463.46(1880) 129 Mass. 367, 37 Am. Rep. 368.
47Sweeny v. Old Colony & Newport R. Co., (1865) 10 Allen (Mass.)
368, 87 Am. Dec. 644; Holmes v. Drew, (1890) 151 Mass. 578, 25
N. E. 22.48Benson v. Baltimore Traction Co., (1893) 77 Md. 535, 26 Ati.
773, 39 Am. St. Rep. 436, 20 L. R. A. 714 (quoting Campbell) ; Hupfer v.
National Distilling Co., (1902) 114 Wis. 279, 90 N. W. 191; Fleckenstein
v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., (1917) 61 N. J. L. 145, 102 At. 700, L. R. A.
1918C 179; San Angelo Water, L. & P. Co. v. Anderson, (Tex. Civ. App.
1922) 244 S. W. 571; Petree v. Davison-Paxon-Stokes Co., (1923) 30 Ga.
App. 490, 118 S. E. 697; Statkunas v. Promboim, (1931) 274 Mass. 515,
174 N. E. 919.
49Howe v. Ohmart, (1893) 7 Ind. App. 32, 33 N. E. 466; Phillips v.
Library Co. of Burlington, (1893) 55 N. J. L. 307, 27 Ati. 478; St. Louis,
BUSINESS VISITORS AND INVITEES
when Professor Bohlen wrote his initial article"° setting forth
the theory that the duty is the price of the benefit, the cases which
might have been cited in support of it were actually in a very
small minority.
PREMISES OPEN TO THE PUBLIC
This long, and it is hoped not too tedious review of past his-
tory is of course preliminary to a consideration of the present
state of the law, and the proper rule. This much at least should
be clear from these early cases: that the duty of the occupier
toward his "invitee" was not, in its inception, a matter of a quid
pro quo for a benefit conferred or hoped for. It rested rather
upon an implied representation of safety, a holding out of the
premises as suitable for the purpose for which the visitor came;
and this was stated in terms of an invitation to come. "Invitation"
is today a much discredited word, if only because a private social
guest is invited, and yet is not in the legal sense an "invitee;"
but the idea which it conveys, that the place is held out to the
visitor as prepared for his reception, is still essentially valid.
Now an invitation may be to the general public, or it may be
private, to the individual only.5' The early cases were preoccupied
with public invitation, because with one exception they involved
premises open to the public. It is well, therefore, to begin with
this problem. An examination of the cases reveals that, while
there is frequent mention of "business" or "benefit" to the occu-
pier, it appears for the most part as a reason for allowing recovery
to customers, who obviously are invited; and the decisions in
which recovery is denied because of its absence are astonishingly
few.
"Thrown open to the public" requires definition. It is not
enough that the public at large, or any considerable number of
persons, are allowed to wander at will over the defendant's land
for their own pleasure or advantage. That is a license only, which
I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Dooley, (1906) 77 Ark. 561, 92 S. W. 789; Allen v.
Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., (1916) 111 Miss. 267, 71 So. 386; Hanson v.
Spokane Valley L. & W. Co., (1910) 58 Wash. 6,107 Pac. 863.
5OBohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort,
(1905) 44 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 209, 227.
51As to private invitations, see infra, p. 602. The distinction between
public and private invitation is suggested in 1 Thompson, Negligence
(1901) secs. 994-996; Durning v. Hyman, (1926) 286 Pa. St. 376, 133 At.
568, 53 A. L. R. 851. The same distinction would appear to hold good as to
those riding in automobiles. The gratuitous guest in a private car is always
held to be no-more than a licensee. But a non-paying passenger in a bus or
taxicab is still a passenger, when he rides as one of the public.
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carries with it no assurance of care taken to make the place safe
for the visitor, and tells him in effect that he is expected to
look out for himself.5" The illustration which comes at once to
mind is that of pedestrians permitted by long usage to walk
along railway tracks. 53 What is required is something in the way
of an appearance of offering to the public and inducement to
enter, of preparation, or assurance that the premises are provided
and intended for public use-that the public will not merely be
tolerated, but is welcome, encouraged and desired to come. It is
in this sense that "invitation" is used quite properly. Thus when
a strip of private land abutting upon the sidewalk is so paved
that it is indistinguishable from the highway,54 or a private way"5
52Hounsell v. Smyth, (1860) 7 C. B. (N.S.) 731, 29 L. J. C. P. 203;
Vanderbeck v. Hendry, (1871) 34 N. J. L. 467 (well stated) ; East Hill
Cemetery Co. v. Thompson, (1912) 53 Ind. App. 417; Monroe v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., (1909) 151 N. C. 374, 66 S. E. 315; Gillis v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co., (1868) 59 Pa. St. 129, 98 Am. Dec. 317; Douglas v. Bergland,
(1921) 216 Mich. 380, 185 N. W. 819, 20 A. L. R. 197; Borgins v. California-
Oregon Power Co., (Cal. App. 1927) 84 Cal. App. 465, 258 Pac. 394;
Ellison v. Alabama Marble Co., (Ala. 1931) 136 So. 787.53Barry v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., (1883) 92 N. Y. 289. 44 Am.
Rep. 377; Phipps v. Oregon R. & N. Co., (C.C. Wash. 1908) 161 Fed.
376; Matthews v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., (1903) 67 S. C. 499. 46 S. E.
335, 65 L. R. A. 286; Meitzner v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., (1909) 224
Pa. St. 352, 73 Atl. 434. Cf. Reardon v. Thompson, (1889) 149 Mass.
267, 21 N. E. 369; Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Nolton, (1937) 58 Nev. 133,
71 P. (2d) 1051; Rooney v. Woolworth, (1905) 78 Conn. 167, 61 Atl.
366; Ellsworth v. Metheney, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1900) 104 Fed. 119, 51
L. R. A. 389.
"Beck v. Carter, (1877) 68 N. Y. 283, 23 Am. Rep. 175; Holnes v.
Drew, (1890) 151 Mass. 578, 25 N. E. 22; Sears v. Merrick, (1899) 175
Mass. 25, 55 N. E. 476; Leighton v. Dean, (1917) 117 Me. 40, 102 At. 565,
L. R. A. 1918B 922; Zetley v. Jame Realty Co., (1924) 185 Wis. 205, 201
N. W. 252; Weidman v. Consolidated Gas, E. L. & P. Co., (1929) 158
Md. 39, 148 Atl. 270; Marsh v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., (1904) 92 Minn.
182, 99 N. W. 630. Otherwise if the boundary line is marked out so that
the private land does not appear to be intended for public use. Kelley v.
City of Columbia, (1884) 41 Ohio St. 263. Or if the defendant did not
create the appearance or know of it. Conroy v. Allison Storage Warehouse
Co., (Mass. 1935) 197 N. E. 454.55Crogan v. Schiele, (1885) 53 Conn. 186, 1 Atl. 899, 55 Am. Rep.
88; Hanson v. Spokane Valley L. & W. Co., (1910) 58 Wash. 6, 107 Pac.
863; Black v. Central R. Co., (1913) 85 N. J. L. 197, 89 Atd. 24, 51
L. R. A. (N.S.) 1215; Reddington v. Getchell, (1919) 40 R. I. 463, 101
Atl. 123; Diotiollari v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., (1924) 95 W. Va.
692, 122 S. E. 161; Pacific Hardware & Steel Co. v. Monical, (C.C.A. 9th
Cir. 1913) 205 Fed. 116; Boutlier v. Suburban Gas & Elec. Co., (1917)
226 Mass. 479, 116 N. E. 251, Ann. Cas. 1918C 910; Brezee v. Powers,
(1890) 80 Mich. 172. 45 N. V. 1130; cf. Collins v. Hazel Lumber Co..
(1909) 54 Wash. 524, 103 Pac. 798. Otherwise if a notice is posted that
the way is not open to the public. Bowler v. Pacific Mills, (1909) 200 Mass.
364, 86 N. E. 767, 21 L. R. A. (N.S.) 976, 128 Am. St. Rep. 432;
Moffatt v. Kenny, (1899) 174 Mass. 311. 54 N. E. 850; Mitchell v. Ozan-
Graysonia Lbr. Co., (1921) 151 Ark. 6. 235 S. W. 44. Or if it has not the
appearance of a public thoroughfare. Stevens v. Nichols, (1892) 155
Mass. 472, 29 N. E. 1150, 15 L. R. A. 459.
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or a railroad crossing5 6 or footbridge5 is given the appearance of
a public thoroughfare, the owner is regarded as holding it out
to the public as provided for use by the public as the public,
for the purpose of passage. When a landowner tacitly permits
the boys of the neighborhood to play baseball on his vacant
lot, they are licensees only;" but if he installs playground equip-
ment and throws it open to the children of the town as offered
and provided for the purpose, even though quite gratuitously,
there is then a public invitation.59
When land is thus thrown open to the public, the condition of
the premises begins to affect the public interest. The occupier
does not, of course, become a public utility or a public servant,
like a common carrier; nor is his land dedicated irrevocably to
public use, since he may always withdraw his invitation and
exclude anyone he likes. But when the public, as such, is led to
believe that premises have been provided, offered, held out for
public entry, both the earlier and the later cases make it clear
that the occupier assumes a duty of reasonable care to see that the
place is safe for the purpose, which extends to those who are
injured when they enter in response to the invitation. This duty
is not far removed from the obligation to the public upon the
highway itself, or to those who stray a few feet from it in the
course of travel.6" No essential reason is apparent that compensa-
56Sweeny v. Old Colony & Newport R. Co., (1865) 10 Allen (Mass.)
368, 87 Am. Dec. 644; Mercer v. South Eastern & Chatham R. Cos., (1922]
2 K. B. 549, 92 L. J. K. B. 25.
57Missouri Pac. R. Co. -. English, (1933) 187 Ark. 557, 61 S. W.
(2d) 445; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Dooley, (1906) 77 Ark. 561, 92
S. W. 789 (steps); Allen v. Yazoo & M. V. R Co., (1916) 111 Miss. 267,
71 So. 386 (path); Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Blackwell, (1918) 201
Aud. 657, 79 So. 129 (passage); Kruntorad v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.,
(1924) 111 Neb. 753, 197 N. W. 611; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
Snow's Adm'r, (1930) 235 Ky. 211, 30 S. W. (2d) 885 (private way);
Baltimore & 0. S. V. R. Co. v. Slaughter, (1906) 167 Ind. 330, 79 N. E.
186, 7 L. R. A. (N.S.) 597, 119 Am. St. Rep. 503; Lawson v. Shreveport
Waterworks Co., (1903) 111 La. 73, 35 So. 390 (private bridge) ; Galves-
ton H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Schuessler, (1909) 56 Tex. Civ. App. 410, 120
S. IV. 1147.
5sCf. Adams v. American Enka Corp., (1932) 202 N. C. 767, 164 S. E.
367; Dalton v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., (1926) 285 Pa. St. 309,
131 Atl. 724; Bruso v. Eastern States Exposition Co., (Mass. 1929) 168
N. E. 206.
59Cf. Dorsey v. Chautauqua Institution, (1922) 203 App. Div. 251, 196
N. Y. S. 798; Maehlman v. Reuben Realty Co., (1928) 32 Ohio App. 54,
166 N. E. 920; Millurn v. Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co., (1909) 225
Pa. St. 214, 73 Adt. 1106. Compare Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of
Columbus, (1930) 108 Cal. App. 591, 291 Pac. 848, where a swimming-
pool prepared for 600 persons was treated as public.
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tion, benefit, or advantage to the occupier should play any greater
part in the one case than in the other.
Few premises, however, are ever thrown open for all things
to all men. The occupier is free to choose the purpose for which
his land is provided, offered, and to be used, and to invite only
those members of the public who come for that purpose. A rail-
way station, which is certainly the most public of places, invites
all passengers, even those who are to ride free, 1 and it invites
those who come to inquire about transportation.02 It invites also
the friends of passengers who come to meet them on arrival or
to see them off;63 and while some courts have struggled hard to
find economic benefit to the carrier in the possibility that the
friend may render some assistance,0 or have said that the pas-
senger pays for the privilege of bringing his friends,"" it seems
clear that they are held to be "invited" merely for the sufficient
6oCf. Barnes v. Ward, (1850) 9 C. B. 392, 19 L. J. C. P. 195;
Humphries v. Union & G. S. R. Co., (1909) 84 S. C. 202, 65 S. E.
1051; Larkin v. Andrews, (1921) 27 Ga. App. 685, 109 S. E. 518; Murray v.
McShane, (1879) 52 Md. 217, 36 Am. Rep. 367; Ruocco v. United Adver-
tising Corp., (1922) 98 Conn. 241, 119 Atl. 48, 30 A. L. R. 1237; and
see Hardcastle v. South Yorkshire R. & R. D. Co., (1859) 4 H. & N. 67.
61Cf. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co. v. Derby, (1852) 14 How. (U.S.)
468, 14 L. Ed. 502; Abell v. Western Md. R. Co., (1884) 63 Md. 433:
Jacobus v. St. Paul & C. R. Co., (1873) 20 Minn. 125, 18 Am. Rcp. 360;
Doyle v. Fitchburg R. Co., (1894) 162 Mass. 66, 37 N. E. 770, 25 L. R. A.
147, 44 Am. St. Rep. 335; Bailey v. Bartlett, (1932) 112 W. Va. 27, 163
S. E. 615.
62Bradford v. Boston & Me. R. Co., (1894) 160 Mass. 392, 35
N. E. 1131.
63Watkins v. Great Western R. Co., (1877) 46 L. J. C. P. 817;
Thatcher v. Great Western R. Co., (1893) 10 T. L. R. 13; Tough v.
North British R. Co., [1914] Sess. Cas. 291; York v. Canada Atlantic
S. S. Co., (1893) 22 Can. S. C. Rep. 167; Doss v. Missouri, K. & T. R.
Co., (1875) 59 Mo. 27, 21 Am. Rep. 371; Banderob v. Wisconsin Central
R. Co., (1907) 133 Wis. 249, 113 N. W. 738; Hutchins v. Penobscot Bay
& River S. Co., (1913) 110 Me. 369, 86 At. 250. Cf. Klugherz v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., (1903) 90 Minn. 17, 95 N. W. 586, 101
Am. St. Rep. 384 (business with passenger); Butler v. Chicago, R. I. &
P. R. Co., (1911) 155 Mo. App. 287, 136 S. W. 729 (child with shipper).
See 3 Elliott, Railroads (2d ed. 1907) sec. 1256.
64Hamilton v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., (1885) 64 Tex. 251, 53 Am. Rep
756; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Matzdorf, (1908) 102 Tex. 42, 112
S. W. 1036 (no duty where no assistance) ; Arkansas & Louisiana R. Co. v.
Sain, (1909) 90 Ark. 278, 119 S. W. 659 (same) ; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R.
Co. v. Grimsley, (1909) 90 Ark. 64, 117 S. W. 1064 (same) ; Fournier v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., (1934) 286 Mass. 7, 189 N. E. 574, 92
A. L. R. 610.
05Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cogswell, (1909) 23 Okla. 194. 99 Pac.
923, 20 L. R. A. (N.S.) 837; Voisin v. Compagnie G6ngrale Transatlantique,
(1933) 151 Misc. Rep. 498, 270 N. Y. S. 643; McCann v. Anchor Line.
(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1933) 79 F. (2d) 338.
BUSINESS VISITORS AND INVITEES
reason that they come for a railway purpose." The station like-
wise invites one who comes to mail a letter on a train, G7 or to read
a notice required by law to be posted there.08 But it is not provided
for spectators, sightseers and curious children," or for the man
who loiters beyond a reasonable time after missing his train,"0 or
who comes to solicit business for his boarding house7' or to buy
goods from a third person,72 or enters to pay a social visit to a
telegraph operator, 73 or merely to get out of the rain.7 Such
visitors are licensees at most; they are not "invited" by premises
offered to them for the purpose. The business carried on by the
occupier, and his hope of benefit, are of course significant as an
index of the type of visitors who are encouraged to come; but
no less important are the character of the building, the use to
which it is devoted, the customs of the community and the con-
duct of the parties in the past; and "benefit" is by no means
the controlling factor.
Customers in shops 5 and other establislnents7 open for
66Tobin v. Portland, S. & P. R. Co., (1871) 59 Me. 183, 8 Am. Rep.
415; McKone v. Michigan Central P. Co., (1883) 51 Mich. 601, 17 N. W.
74, 47 -Am. Rep. 596; Hutchins v. Penobscot Bay & River S. Co., (1913)
110 Me. 369, 86 Atl. 250; Jackson v. Hines, (1921) 137 Md. 621, 113 At.
129; Powell v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., (1922) 152 Minn. 90, 188 N. W.
61; Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Mathews, (1912) 114 Va. 173, 76 S. F_.
288; Himstreet v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., (1918) 167 Wis. 71, 166
N. W. 665.
67BeI v: Houston & S. R. Co., (1913) 132 I.a. 88, 60 So. 1029, 43
L. R. A- (N.S.) 740; Hale v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (1888) 60 Vt. 605, 15
Atl. 300, 1 L. R. A. 187.
6sSt. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Fairbairn, (1886) 48 Ark. 491, 4
S. W. 50.
69Gillis v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (1868) 59 Pa. St. 129, 98 Am. Dec.
317; Burbank v. Illinois -Cent. R. Co., (1890) 42 La. Ann. 1156, 8 So.
580, 11 L. R. A. 720; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Schwindler, (1882) 101
Pa. St 258, 47 Am. Rep. 706; Midland Valley R. Co. v. Littlejohn, (1914)
44 Okla. 8,143 Pac. 1; Polio v. Ohio River R. Co., (1893) 38 W. Va. 645,
18 S. E. 782.
70Heinlein v. Boston & P. R. Co., (1888) 147 Mass. 136, 16 N. E.
698, 9 Am. St Rep. 676.7
3
1Post v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1893) 23 S. W. 708.
Cf. Norfolk & AV. R. Co. v. Wood, (1901) 99 Va. 156, 37 S. E. 846 ("his
own lawful business").
72Cf. Kruse v. Houston & T. C. R. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 253
S. W. 623.
7sWoolwine's Adm'r v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., (1892) 36 W. Va.
329, 15 S. F. 81.
74Pittsburgh, Ft W. & C. R. Co. v. Bingham, (1876) 29 Ohio St.
364, 23 Am. Rep. 751. Cf. Redigan v. Boston & Me. R. Co., (1891) 155
Mass. 44, 28 N. E. 1133, 14 L. R. A. 276, 31 Am. St. Rep. 520 (taking
short cut through).75The protection afforded of course extends to both entrance and exit.
Stark-v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., (1926) 102 N. J. L. 694, 133 At!. 72;
Greenly v. Miller's, (1930) 111 Conn. 584, 150 Aft. 500; Huber v.
American Drug Stores, (1932) 19 La. App. 430, 140 So. 120; F. V.
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public patronage have been, for obvious reasons, the most common
type of "invitees ;" but it does not follow that no one is invited
to enter such places who does not bring the potentialities of profit.
One who. comes into a store in the reasonable hope of buying
something not sold on the premises is still invited to come."
The ordinary American or Canadian gasoline filling station, which
offers virtually everything in the way of free service except
shining the visitor's shoes, certainly invites the motorist who
stops on the particular occasion only to use the toilet 8 or to get
free air for his tires. Those who enter stores and shops only to
make use of a telephone 9 or a toilet"0 provided for the public
have been held to be invitees; and so has the man who goes into a
bank to get change for a five dollar bill,8' or to an inn to meet a
friend,8 2 or enters upon private land adjoining the sidewalk to
Woolworth Co. v. Williams, (1930) 59 App. D. C. 347, 41 F. (2d) 970;
Royer v. Najarian, (R. I. 1938) 198 AtI. 562; Cooper v. Reinhardt,(1918) 91 N. J. L. 402, 103 Att. 24.
76For example: Francis v. Cockrell, (1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. 184. 39
L. J. Q. B. 113 (race track) ; Cox v. Coulson, [1916] 2 K. B. 177, 85
L. J. K. B. 1081 (theatre) ; Braun v. Vallade, (1917) 33 Cal. App. 279,
164 Pac. 904 (saloon); Beverly Beach Club v. Marron, (1937) 172 Md.
471, 192 Atl. 278 (beach) ; Ilgenfritz v. Missouri Power & Light Co.,
(Mo. 1933) 101 S. W. (2d) 733 (light company) ; Quinn v. Utah Gas &
Coke Co., (1912) 42 Utah 113, 129 Pac. 362, 43 L. R. A. (N.S.) 328 (gas
company); Chatkin v. Talarski, (1937) 123 Conn. 157, 193 Atd. 611 (un-
dertaker); Elkton Auto Sales Corp. v. State to Use of Ferry, (C.C.A. 4th
Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 8 (garage) ; Mastad v. Swedish Brethren, (1901)
83 Minn. 40, 85 N. W. 913, 53 L. R. A. 803 (Swedish picnic) ; Smith v.
Mottman, (Wash. 1938) 77 P. (2d) 376 (seamstress in apartment house
inviting public).
7"Brady v. Parker, (1887) 14 Rettie (Sess. Cas.) 783; ef. Vanderdoes v.
Rumore, (La. App. 1941) 2 So. (2d) 284 (sold out) ; Talcott v. National
Exhibition Co., (1911) 144 App. Div. 337, 128 N. Y. S. 1059 (same);
Schmidt v. George H. Hurd Realty Co., (1927) 170 Minn. 322, 212 N. W.
903 (not yet open for business) ; Lewis-Kures v. Edward R. Walsh &
Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1939,) 102 F. (2d) 42 (attempt to mail letter in
postoffice gone out of business).
7SNelson v. Zamboni, (1925) 164 Minn. 314, 204 N. W. 943.
79Dowling v. MacLean Drug Co., (1928) 248 Ill. App. 270; Ward v.
Avery, (1931) 113 Conn. 394, 155 Atl. 502; Haley v. Deer, (1938) 135
Neb. 459, 282 N. W. 389; cf. Vanderdoes v. Rumore, (La. App. 1941) 2
So. (2d) 284. In Sullivan v. New York Tel. Co., (1913) 157 App. Div.
642, 142 N. Y. S. 735, benefit was found in the fact that the occupier re-
ceived a commission from a pay telephone installed in his store. One using
a telephone in a private home is merely a licensee. Inman v. Home Tel. &
Tel. Co., (1919) 105 Wash. 234. 177 Pac. 234.
s0Campbell v. Weathers, (1941) 153 Kan. 316, 111 P. (2d) 72; cf.
Nelson v. Zamboni, (1925) 164 Minn. 314, 204 N. W. 943.
81American Nat'l Bank v. Wolfe, (1938) 22 Tenn. App. 642, 125
S. W. (2d) 193. Contra, Cobb v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, (1938) 58
Ga. App. 160, 193 S. E. 111, where the plaintiff entered the bank to obtain
a blank form for a promissory note. But quaere: is this a service for
which banks are understood to be open to the public?
8S2Axford v. Prior, (1866) 14 W. R. 611. Cf. Reynolds v. John Brod
Chemical Co., (1915) 192 Ill. App. 157 (drug store used as waiting room
for doctor's office).
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look at a display in a window.s 3 Spectators entering places of
amusement on a pass"' have been held to be "invited," and so have
members of the public who come in response to an advertisement
of "Ashes and boxes given away."8
Children 6 and friends 7 who accompany customers into shops
with no intention of buying anything themselves are held quite
generally to be invitees; and although there is some occasional
effort to find "benefit" in the possibility that the friend may offer
advice or assistance,88 or that the mother may be unable to come
if she must leave her child at home,"5 the reason usually given
is merely that this is included within the purpose for which the
store is thrown open. Thus a child accompanying one on business
83Leighton v. Dean, (1917) 117 Me. 40, 102 Ad. 565, L. R. A. 1918E
922 ("All are invited that some may be persuaded"); cf. Navien v. Cohen,
(1929) 268 Mass. 247, 167 N. E. 666.84Demarest v. Palisades Realty & Amusement Co., (1925) 101 N. J. L.
66, 127 Ad. 536, 38 A. L. R. 352; Blakeley v. White Star Line, (1908)
154 Mich. 635, 118 N. W. 482, 19 L. R. A. (N.S.) 772, 129 Am. St. Rep.
496; Recreation Centre Corp. v. Zimmerman, (1937) 172 Md. 309, 191
At. 233.
85Roper v. Commercial Fibre Co., (1928) 105 N. J. L. 10, 143 Ad. 741.
86Miller v. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co., (1904) 104 Mo. App. 609,
78 S. W. 682; O'Rourke v. Marshall Field & Co., (1923) 307 111. 197,
138 N. E. 625, 27 A. L. R. 1014; Howlett v. Dorchester Trust Co., (1926)
256 Mass. 544, 152 N. E. 895 (bank); Grogan v. O'Keefe's, Inc., (1929)
267 Mass. 189, 166 N. E. 721; Wheaton v. Goldblatt Bros., (Ill. App.
1938) 51 N. E. (2d) 64; Walec v. Jersey State Electric Co., (1904) 125
N. J. L. 90, 13 A. (2d) 301; Carlisle v. J. Weingarten, Inc. (Tex. 1941)
152 S. W. (2d) 1073, reversing (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 120 S. W. (2d)
886; cf. Radle v. Hennepin Avenue Theatre & Realty Co., (1941) 209
Minn. 415, 296 N. W. 510 (mother accompanying child entered in "talent
contest"). Contra, Petree v. Davison-Paxon-Stokes Co., (1923) 30 Ga.
App. 490, 118 S. E. 697. See (1936) 24 Geo. L. J. 723.
S7Kennedy v. Phillips, (1928) 319 Mo. 573, 5 S. W. (2d) 33; Smigielski v.
Nowak, (1940) 124 N. J. L. 235, 11 -. (2d) 251; cf. Goldstein v. Healy,
(1921) 187 Cal. 206, 201 Pac. 462; Jones v. Bland, (1921) 182
N. C. 70, 73, 108 S. E. 344, 16 A. L. R. 1383 (visiting guest at hotel);
Greenfield v. Hospital Ass'n of Schenectady, (1940) 258 App. Div. 352, 16
N. Y. S. (2d) 729; Alabama Baptist Hospital Board v. Carter, (1932)
226 Ala. 109, 145 So. 443; Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul v. Thompson,
(1914) 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13, 15 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1025; Cohen v.
General Hospital Society, (1931) 113 Conn. 188, 154 At. 435; McLeod v.
St. Thomas Hospital, (1936) 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S. W. (2d) 917 (all cases
of visitors to patients in hospitals). Contra, Fleckeustein v. Great A. & P.
Tea Co., (1917) 91 N. J. L. 145, 102 At. 700, L. R. A. 1918C 179 (but see
the second case cited above) ; Sandwell v. Elliott Hospital, (N. H. 1942)
24 A. (2d) 273 (visitor to charity patient in hospital).
88Or may be induced to buy himself. Kennedy v. Phillips, (1928) 319
Mo. 573, 5 S. W. (2d) 33. Compare the cases of friends accompanying
railway passengers, supra, notes 63-66.
S5Grogan v. O'Keefe's, Inc., (1929) 267 Mass. 189, 166 N. E. 721.
The economic interest is of course clear when a purchase is made for the
child. Belcher v. John M. Smyth Co., (1926) 243 II1. App. 65; Feingold
,. S. S. Kresge Co., (1935) 116 N. J. L. 146, 183 At!. 170.
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at a private residence9" is only a licensee. Passengers in automo-
biles who go with drivers to garages, 91 or filling stations"' and
parking lots, 93 have been held in the same manner to be invitees.
Tourists who visit factories have been held to be "invited" when
the initiative comes from the management under circumstances in-
dicating that the premises are thus open to the public," but not
where a group of school children request the privilege in a plant not
otherwise open for the purpose95-although any economic advan-
tage in the form of advertising or goodwill would appear to be
the *same in either case. It is possible to discern much the same
distinction in the case of salesmen drumming up trade,90 or work-
men in search of employment, 7 who are treated as invitees when
90Burchell v. Hickisson, (1880) 50 L. J. Q. B. 101.91Pope v. Willow Garages, (1930) 274 Mass. 440, 174 N. E. 727;
Gordon v. Freeman, (1934) 193 Minn. 97, 258 N. W. 19; Warner v.
Lucey, (1923) 207 App. Div. 241, 201 N. Y. S. 658, aff'd (1924) 238
N. Y. 638, 144 N. E. 824. Contra: Murphy v. Huntley, (1925) 251 Mass.
555, 146 N. E. 710 (but apparently overruled by the first case cited supra) ;
Rhode v. Duff, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1913) 208 Fed. 115. In Loney v. Laramie
Auto Co., (1927) 36 Wyo. 339, 255 Pac. 350, 53 A. L. R. 73, the passenger
was held to be an "agent" of the driver because he gave assistance in
paying the bill.92Wingrove v. Home Land Co., (1938) 120 W. Va. 100, 196 S. E. 563,
116 A. L. R. 1197. Contra, Morse v. Sinclair Automobile Service Corp.,
(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 298.93Kelley v. Goldberg, (1938) 288 Mass. 78, 192 N. E. 513; Gray v.
Watson, (1936) 54 Ga. App. 885, 189 S. E. 616; Bremer v. Smith, (1937)
126 Pa. Super. 408, 191 Atl. 395.94Deach v. Woolner Distilling Co., (1914) 187 Ill. App. 524 ("mutuality
of interest" specifically rejected) ; Gilliland v. Bondurant, (Mo. App. 1932)
51 S. W. (2d) 559, aff'd (1933) 332 Mo. 881, 59 S. W. (2d) 679. But see,
apparently contra, Weaver v. Carnegie Steel Co., (1909) 223 Pa. St. 238,
72 Atd. 552, 21 L. R. A. (N.S.) 466.95Benson v. Baltimore Traction Co., (1893) 77 Md. 535, 26 Atd. 773,
39 Am. St. Rep. 436, 20 L. R. A. 714; Roe v. St. Louis Independent Packing
Co., (1920) 203 Mo. App. 11, 217 S. W. 335; cf. Myers v. Gulf Public
Service Corp., (1931) 15 La. App. 589, 132 So. 416; Connole v. Floyd
Plant Food Co., (Mo. App. 1936) 96 S. W. (2d) 655 (private inspection):
Knight v. Farmers' & Merchants' Gin Co., (1923) 159 Ark. 423, 252
S. W. 30 (stockholders). But cf. Skarl v. Willow Creek Coal Co., (Utah
1937) 69 P. (2d) 502.96Hartman v. Miller, (Pa. Super. 1941) 17 A. (2d) 652; see Live-
right v. Max Lifsitz Furniture Co., (1936) 1;7 N. J. L. 243, 187 Atil. 583;
Vargas v. Blue Seal Bottling Works, (1930) 12 La. App. 652, 126 So.
707; Southwest Cotton Co. v. Pope, (1923) 25 Ariz. 364, 218 Pac. 152.
Contra, Lanstein v. Acme White Lead & Color Works, (1934) 285 Mass.
328, 189 N. E. 44.
97Steiskal v. Marshall Field & Co., (1909) 238 Il1. 92, 87 N. E. 117;
St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Wirbel, (1912) 104 Ark. 236, 149 S. W.
92, Ann. Cas. 1914C 277 (well stated) ; Ziegler v. Oil Country Specialties
Mfg. Co., (1921) 108 Kan. 589, 196 Pac. 603; Brigman v. Fiske-Cartcr
Const. Co., (1926) 192 N. C. 791, 136 S. E. 125, 49 A. L. R. 773; Mid-
eastern Contracting Co. v. O'Toole, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 909:
Rhodes v. J. R. Watkins Co., (1932) 16 Tenn. App. 163, 65 S. W. (2d)
1098; Denny v. Riverbank Court Hotel Co., (1933) 282 Mass. 176. 184
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they come to an office which they have good reason to believe to
be open for consideration of possible dealings with them, but not
when they enter without such encouragement. 8 A canvasser
calling at a private home is certainly nothing more than a licen-
see.9 Again any possibility of pecuniary benefit, which can arise
only if the defendant should decide to deal with his visitor, is the
same in either case. Prospective tenants0 0 and purchasers " of
real estate are likewise "invited" if they come in response to
advertisements or other active encouragement, but not if they
come on their own initiative to make casual inquiry as to whether
there may be a vacant apartment in the future.'02
Anyone who enters a business establishment in order to pay
a social visit to an employee is obviously a licensee at most, °10
N. E. 452; Gulf Refining Co. v. Moody, (1935) 172 Miss. 377, 160 So. 559;
McGuire v. Bridges, (1914) 49 Can. S. C. 632, 20 Doam. L. Rep. 45;
cf. Hayward v. Drury Lane Theatre, [1917] 2 K. B. 899, 87 L. J. K. B.
1318 (rehearsal); Radle v. Hennepin Avenue Theatre & Realty Co.,(Minn. 1941) 296 N. W. 510 ("talent contest").98Larmore v. Crown Point Iron Co., (1886) 101 N. Y. 391, 4 N. E.
752, 54 Am. Rep. 718; American Ry. Express Co. v. Gilbreath, (C.C.A.
6th Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 809 (no authority in servant to invite) ; Cohen
v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., (1933) 11 N. J. Misc. 817, 168 Atl. 792. Cf.
Lanstein v. Acme White Lead & Color Works, (1934) 285 Mass. 328,
189 N. E. 44.
99Stacy v. Shapiro, (1925) 212 App. Div. 723, 209 N. Y. S. 305;
Reuter v. Kenmore Bldg. Co., (1934) 153 Misc. Rep. 646, 276 N. Y. S.
545; see Hart v. Cole, (1892) 156 Mass. 475, 31 N. E. 644, 16 L. R. A. 557
(as to pedlars) ; Konick v. Champneys, (1919) 108 Wash. 35, 183 Pac. 75,
6 A. L. R. 459; and cf. Jones v. Asa G. Candler, Inc., (1918) 22 Ga. App.
717, 97 S. E. 112 (soliciting charitable contribution).
looWithers v. Brooklyn Real Estate Exchange, (1905) 106 App. Div.
255, 94 N. Y. S. 328; Kalus v. Bass, (1914) 122 Md. 467, 89 At. 731,
Ann. Cas. 1916A 985 (invitation includes members of family brought along) ;
McHugh v. Rubenstein, (1914) 185 Ill. App. 235; Serota v. Salmnsolm.(1926) 256 Mass. 224, 152 N. E. 242, 46 A. L. R. 517; Turner v. Carneal,
(1931) 156 Va. 889, 159 S. E. 72; Eggen v. Hickman, (1938) 274 Ky.
550, 119 S. W. (2d) 633; Brown v. Davenport Holding Co., (1938) 134
Neb. 455, 279 N. W. 161, 118 A. L. R. 423; Lord v. Lowell Institution for
Savings, (1939) 304 Mass. 212, 23 N. E. (2d) 101; Marston v. Reynolds,
(1912) 211 Mass. 590, 98 N. E. 601.
oISmith v. Jackson, (1903) 70 N'. J. L. 183, 56 At. 118: Bonello v.
Powell, (Mo. App. 1920) 223 S. W. 1075; Petluck v. McGolrick Realty
Co., (1934) 240 App. Div. 61, 268 N. Y. S. 782.
32Mills v. Heidingsfield, (La App. 1939) 192 So. 786; Mortgage
Comm'n Servicing Corp. v. Brock, (Ga. App. 1939) 4 S. E. (2d) 669.
'O3Woolwine's Adm'r v. Chesapeake & Ohio IL Co., (1892) 36 WV. Va.
329, 15 S. E. 81; Galveston Oil Co. v. Morton, (1888) 70 Tex. 400, 7
S. W. 756; Dixon v. Swift, (1903) 98 1 Me. 207, 56 Atl. 761; Ridley v.
National Casket Co., (1916) 161 N. Y. S. 444; Lange v. St. Johns Lbr. Co.,
(1925) 115 Or. 337, 237 Pac. 696; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Mansfield,(1931) 160 Miss. 672, 134 So. 579; Gotch v. K. & B. Packing & Provision
Co., (1933) 93 Colo. 276, 25 P. (2d) 719, 89 A. L. R. 753; Murry
Chevrolet Co. v. Cotton. (1934) 169 Miss. 521, 152 So. 657; Gunnarson v.
Robert Jacob, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1938) 94 F. (2d) 170.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
since no one can reasonably suppose that the place is open for
such a purpose. The same is true, in general, of one who seeks
to sell the workman insurance, 10 4 or to have other personal busi-
ness dealings with him.105 There are a number of cases, however,
in which those who bring meals 1°6 or water' 07 to employees have
been held to be "invited" on the ground that the employer had
so far permitted and encouraged the practice that it might reason-
ably be believed that the premises were open to any member of
the public coming for such a purpose. The effort sometimes made
to find "benefit" to the employer in the form of keeping his work-
men happy appears rather disingenuous; at least it fails to dis-
tinguish the cases.
Finally, there are a substantial number of decisions in which
"invitation" has been found although no possible financial ad-
vantage to the occupier is apparent, and the premises have been
thrown open with no pecuniary end whatever in view. There
are first of all the cases, mentioned above, 0 8 of private ways or
strips adjoining the highway, paved or otherwise arranged to give
the appearance of public invitation. The attempt to distinguish
these on the basis of some especial deceptiveness, or an appear-
ance that they are part of the public highway itself seems scarcely
sound, if the real basis of liability is an encouragement to the
lO4Indian Refining Co. v. Mobley, (1909) 134 Ky. 822, 121 S. W.
657; Roadman v. C. E. Johnson Motor Sales, (Minn. 1941) 297 N. W. 166.
l°sNorris v. Hugh Nawn Contracting Co., (1910) 206 Mass. 58, 91
N. E. 886, 31 L. R. A. (N.S.) 623, 19 Ann. Cas. 424 (selling papers);
Hamakawa v. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co., (1935) 4 Cal. (2d) 499,
50 P. (2d) 803 (buying goldfish) ; Roth v. Schaefer, (1939) 300 III. App.
464, 21 N. E. (2d) 328 (asking help); Berlin Mills Co. v. Croteau,
(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1898) 88 Fed. 860; Freeman v. Levy, (1939) 60 Ga. App.
861, 5 S. E. (2d) 61; Hickman v. First Nat'l Bank of Great Falls, (Mont.
1941) 117 P. (2d) 275; Pries v. Atlanta Enterprises, (Ga. App. 1941) 17
S. E. (2d) 902 (obtaining indorsement of employee on personal promis-
sory note).
lOojllinois Central R. Co. v. Hopkins, (1902) 200 I11. 122, 64 N. E.
1014; Bustillos v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., (Tex. Comm. App.
1919) 211 S. W. 929; Coburn v. Village of Swanton, (1921) 95 Vt. 320,
115 At. 153; Taylor v. McCowat-Mercer Printing Co., (D. Tenn. 1939)
27 F. Supp. 880, aff'd (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 868. Contra, but
possibly distinguishable for lack of encouragement to come: Fitzpatrick v.
Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co., (1898) 61 N. J. L. 378, 39 At. 675; Muench
v. Heinemann, (1903) 119 Wis. 441, 96 N. W. 800; Blossom Oil & Cotton
Co. v. Poteet, (1911) 104 Tex. 230, 136 S. W. 432, 35 L. R. A. (N.S.)
449; and cf. Gibson, Parish & Co. v. Sziepienski, (1890) 37 Ill. App. 601
("No Admittance").
lO7Atkins v. Lackawanna Transportation Co., (1899) 182 Ill. 237, 54
N. E. 1004; Purtell v. Philadelphia Coal Co., (1912) 256 II1. 110, 99 N. E.
899, 43 L. R. A. (N.S.) 193, Ann. Cas. 1913E 335.
08See supra, notes 54-57, and text. Compare the cases of ways of
entry cited infra, note 169.
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public, as such, to enter-and particularly so since in most of
the cases the visitor has clearly not been misled as to the char-
acter of the private way. It has been held also that private prem-
ises thrown open for free public meetings or lectures,""3 or for
gratuitous use as a public playground or recreation center,"10 must
be inspected and kept in safe condition for the reception of those
who enter them without pay. In addition, there are municipal
premises. The immunity conferred on municipal corporations
is in process of being broken down by degrees, particularly with
regard to land and buildings open to the public;'"' but there has
been little discussion of the status of the visitor in such a case.
Without exception, once the immunity is removed at all, mem-
bers of the public who enter municipal parks and playgrounds,"'!
swimming pools, 1 3 libraries,"14 comfort stations,1 5 wharves,'" golf
courses,"17 community centers," 8 or a state canal lock open to
'09Davis v. Central Congregational Society, (1880) 129 Mass. 367, 37
Am. Rep. 368 (church conference); Howe v. Oiunart (1893) 7 Ind. App.
32, 33 N. E. 466 (college literary society) ; Bunnell v. Waterbury Hospital,
(1925) 103 Conn. 520, 131 Atl. 501 (lecture). Cf. Richmond & Man-
chester R. Co. v. Moore's Adm'r, (1897) 94 Va. 493, 27 S. E. 70, 37 L. R. A.
258 (balloon ascension at amusement park); Recreation Centre Corp. v.
Zimmerman, (1937) 172 Md. 309, 191 Atl. 233 (free spectators at bowling
contest) ; Napier v. First Congregational Church, (1937) 157 Or. 110. 70
P. (2d) 43 (coming to see minister for advice) ; Geiger v. Simpson M. E.
Church, (1928) 174 Minn. 389, 219 N. W. 463 (social meeting in church) ;
Guilford v. Yale University, (Conn. 1942) 23 A. (2d) 917 (college class
reunion under the hallowed elms); Weigel v. Reintjes, (Mo. App. 1941)
154 S. W. (2d) 412 (church service).
lODorsey v. Chautauqua Institution, (1922) 203 App. Div. 251, 196
N. Y. S. 798; Maehlman v. Reuben Realty Co., (1928) 32 Ohio App. 54.
166 N. E. 920; Mfillum v. Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co.. (1909) 22S
Pa. St. 214, 73 Atl. 1106. Cf. Converse v. Walker, (1883) 30 Hun (N.Y.)
596 (hotel open for public celebration).
"'Note, (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 430.
"'-Parks: Ellis v. Fulham Borough Council, [1938] 1 K. B. 212, 107
L. J. K. B. 84; City of Canon City v. Cox, (1913) 55 Colo. 264. 133 Pac.
1040; City of Anadarko v. Swain, (1914) 42 Okla. 741, 142 Pac. 1104;
Earden v. City of Grafton, (1925) 99 IV. Va. 249, 128 S. E. 375; City of
Sapulpa v. Young, (1931) 147 Okla. 179, 296 Pac. 418.
Playgrounds: McStravick v. City of Ottawa, [1929] 3 Dom. L. Rep.
317, 63 Ont. L. Rev. 317, aff'd [1929] 4 Dom. L. Rep. 492, 64 Ont. L. Rep.
275; Van Dyke v. City of Utica, (1922) 203 App. Div. 26, 196 N. Y. S.
277; Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, (1925) 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac. 710:
Paraska v. City of Scranton, (1933) 313 Pa. St. 227, 169 Ad. 434.
"'City of Longmont v. Swearingen, (1927) 81 Colo. 246, 254 Pac.
1000; City of Columbia v. Wilks, (Miss. 1936) 166 So. 925; Ashworth v.
City of Clarksburg, (1937) 118 W. Va. 476, 190 S. E. 763.
224-Nickell v. Windsor, [1927] 1 Dom. L. Rep. 379, 59 Ont. L. Rep. 618.
"'5Pitman v. City of New York, (1910) 141 App. Div. 670, 125 N. Y. S.
941.
"60 -ise v. City of North Bend, (1931) 138 Or. 150, 6 P. (2d) 30.
"3Lowe v. City of Gastonia, (1937) 211 N. C. 564, 191 S. E. 7 (caddy).
"'8Kelly v. Board of Education, (1920) 191 App. Div. 251. 180
N. Y. S. 796.
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visitors,1 9 although they pay nothing, have been held to be "in-
vited," and entitled to affirmative care to make the place safe.
There has been no attempt to find any pecuniary benefit to the
defendant in such cases, and indeed it is difficult to see how it
can possibly be found. The basis of liability, when it is stated, is
merely that of public invitation.
When we turn to those persons entering business premises
open to the public who are held merely to be licensees, it is the
absence of "invitation" which at once becomes apparent. The list
includes loafers, loiterers, and those who come in only to get out
of the weather ;12° a drunken man in a saloon forbidden by law
to sell him liquor ;121 those in search of their servants, children,
and other third persons ;122 spectators and sightseers who are not
in any way encouraged to come ;123 salesmen and workmen looking
for employment at a place not apparently open for the pur-
pose ;124 one who drives through a cemetery for pleasure ;"- per-
sons taking short cuts through passages not open to the public
as a thoroughfare ;126 those who come for social visits or personal
business dealings with employees, not encouraged by the em-
119See Hall v. State, (1940) 173 Misc. Rep. 903, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 20.
120Kneiser v. Belasco-Blackwood Co., (1913) 22 Cal. App. 205, 133
Pac. 989; Dye v. Rule, (1934) 138 Kan. 808, 28 P. (2d) 758; Murry
Chevrolet Co. v. Cotton, (1934) 169 Miss. 521, 152 So. 657; Pittsburgh,
Ft. W. & C. R. Co., v. Bingham, (1876) 29 Ohio St. 364, 23 Am. Rep. 751;
Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Martin's Adm'r, (1903) 116 Ky. 554, 25
Ky. L. Rep. 787, 76 S. W. 394, 77 S. W. 718, 63 L. R. A. 469, 105 Am. St.
Rep. 229; Texas Co. v. Haggard, (Tenn. App. 1939) 134 S. W. (2d) 889.
Cf. Heinlein v. Boston & P. R. Co., (1888) 147 Mass. 136, 16 N. E. 698,
9 Am. St. Rep. 676. It may be suggested that in the case of some premises,
such as the small town pool room, even loafers are invited. Compare Camp-
bell v. Weathers, (1941) 153 Kan. 316, 111 P. (2d) 72.2 Rolleston v. Cassirer & Co., (1907) 3 Ga. App. 161, 59 S. E. 442.
122Plummer v. Dill, (1892) 156 Mass. 426, 31 N. E. 128, 32 Am. St.
Rep. 463 (servant); Faris v. Hoberg, (1892) 134 Ind. 269, 33 N. E.
1028, 39 Am. St. Rep. 261 (customer) ; Flatley v. Acme Garage, (1923)
196 Iowa 82, 194 N. W. 180 (child). Otherwise when the premises are
open for such purpose. Klugherz v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., (1903)
90 Minn. 17, 95 N. W. 586, 101 Am. St. Rep. 384 (carrier) ; Axford v.
Prior, (1866) 14 W. R. 611 (inn).
123See supra, note 69. Otherwise if the premises are thrown open to
spectators; see supra, note 84.
124See supra, note 98.
125East Hill Cemetery Co. v. Thompson, (1912) 53 Ind. App. 417.
126Baird v. Goldberg, (1940) 283 Ky. 558, 142 S. W. (2d) 120
(vestibule of store) ; Redigan v. Boston & Me. R. Co., (1891) 155 Mass.
44, 28 N. E. 1133, 14 L. R. A. 276, 31 Am. St. Rep. 520 (railroad prop-
erty) ; Myszkiewicz v. Lord Baltimore Filling Station, (Md. 1935) 178
Atl. 856.
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ployer;12- one who seeks to borrow a tool,1"28 or to pick up refuse
for his own purposes ;129 a stranger entering an office building to
post a letter in a mail-box provided for the use of tenants only.13 0
It is not the lack of "business interest" which deprives these
people of protection, since the possible advantages of advertising
and goodwill, and the chance that the visitor may be induced to
change his mind and make a purchase, would seem to be at least
as great as in many cases where "invitation" has been found.
It is rather the fact that the premises obviously are not pro-
vided for such a purpose; that the visitor is not solicited or en-
couraged to come for such an end; in short, that he must under-
stand that his presence will be suffered at most, and that he is
not invited to come.
There are two groups of cases which appear to have particu-
lar significance in connection with this matter of business inter-
est. One of these involves customers who enter to shop or to buy,
and subsequently make use of toilets, rest rooms and other ac-
commodations on the premises. The cases divide very clearly.
If the toilet is provided and maintained for the use of customers,
and so is thrown open to them with other parts of the premises,
as is usual in department stores, railway stations and theatres,
the customer is held to be an invitee when he uses it.2' If, on the
other hand, it is kept for the private use of the occupier and his
employees, is not provided for customers, and the permission
to use it is granted only as a favor to the individual, as is often
the case in the comer diug store or the butcher shop, then he is
127See supra, notes 103-106. This holds true even though the premises
are othervise open free to the public. Hall v. State, (1940) 173 Misc. Rep.
903, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 20.
'
28Laporta v. New York Central R. Co., (1916) 224 Mass. 100, 112
N. E. 643.
-
29Lavoie v. Nashua Gummed & Coated Paper Co., (1918) 79 N. H. 97,
105 Atl. 4. Otherwise where it is advertised to be given away to the
public. Roper v. Commercial Fibre Co., (1928) 105 N. J. L. 10, 143
Atl. 741.
13OBrosnan v. Koufman, (1936) 249 Mass. 495, 2 N. E. (2d) 441,
104 A. L. R_ 1177; cf. O'Brien v. Harvard Restaurant & Liquor Co.,
(Mass. 1941) 38 N. E. (2d) 658 (pay telephone in basement). Compare
the cases of those mailing letters on trains, supra, note 67.
131Majn v. Lehman, (1922) 294 Mo. 579, 243 S. W. 91; Seabridge v.
Poli, (1922) 98 Conn. 297, 119 AtI. 214; Scott v. Kline's, Inc. (Mo. App.
1926) 284 S. W. 831; McCluskey v. Duncan, (1927) 216 Ala. 388, 113 So.
250; M. N. Bleich Co. v. Emmett, (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 295 S. W. 223;
Randolph v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., (D. Pa. 1932) 2 F. Supp. 462, aff'd
(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1933) 64 F. (2d) 247 (telephone); De Verdi v. Weiss,(1936) 16 Cal. App. (2d) 439, 60 P. (2d) 879; Stewart v. Lido Cafe.(1936) 13 Cal. App. (2d) 46, 56 P. (2d) 553; Bass v. Hunt, (1940) 151
Kan. 740, 100 P. (2d) 696.
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no more than a licensee.' 3 2 The Restatement of the Law of
Torts 1" has dealt with these cases in terms of an "area of busi-
ness invitation." But so far as there is any question of benefit
to the defendant, which surely can be only in the form of goodwill
or a satisfied customer, is there any distinction to be found be-
tween the two situations? Is not one merely a matter of public
invitation, the other of private license?
The second group of cases involve landlords who lease prem-
ises for the admission of the public. The lessor of course derives
economic benefit, his rent, when he leases a private dwelling for
the private use of a private tenant. He receives precisely the same
benefit, and no other, when he leases a building for use as a
theatre or an hotel. Yet in the first case he is not tinder any
obligation to inspect and repair the premises before he turns
them over,34 while in the second he is.135 The.difference, of
course, is that in the second case the lease is for the purpose of
inviting the public to enter. The landlord's responsibility to the
public is so great that it cannot be shifted even to a tenant who
covenants to make repairs, 138 although it has been held that he
132Herzog v. Hemphill, (1907) 7 Cal. App. 116, 93 Pac. 899; Menteer
v. Scalzo Fruit Co., (1912) 240 Mo. 177, 144 S. W. 833; Corbett v.
Spanos, (1918) 37 Cal. App. 200, 173 Pac. 769; Keeran v. Spurgeon Merc.
Co., (1922) 194 Iowa 1240, 191 N. W. 99, 27 A. L. R. 579 (leaving coat
in back of store) ; Schmidt v. George H. Hurd Realty Co., (1927) 170
Minn. 322, 212 N. W. 903 (restaurant not yet open for business) ; West v.
Smith & Kelley Co., (1931) 42 Ga. App. 653, 157 S. E. 261; Collins v.
Sprague's Benson Pharmacy, (1932) 124 Neb. 210, 245 N. W. 602; Mcd-
craft v. Merchants Exchange, (1931) 211 Cal. 404, 295 Pac. 822; Live-
right v. Max Lifsitz Furniture Co., (1936) 117 N. J. L. 243, 187 Atd. 583;
Napier v. First Congregational Church, (1937) 157 Or. 110, 70 P. (2d)
43; McNamara v. MacLean, (1939) 302 Mass. 428, 19 N. E. (2d) 544:
McMullen v. M. & M. Hotel Co., (1940) 227 Iowa 1061, 290 N. W. 3
(telephone in drug store prescription room) ; Hashim v. Chimiklis, (N.H.
1941) 21 A. (2d) 166; O'Brien v. Harvard Restaurant & Liquor Co.,
(Mass. 1941) 38 N. E. (2d) 658. Cf. Carey v. Gray, (1922) 98 N. J. L.
217, 119 At. 176 (toilet in private home).
133Sec. 343, Comment b.
134Lane v. Cox, [1897] 1 Q. B. 415, 66 L. J. Q. B. 193 (workman)
Hanson v. Beckwith, (1897) 20 R. I. 165, 37 At. 702, 38 L. R. A. 716
(invitee of tenant) ; McKenzie v. Cheetham, (1891) 83 Me. 543, 22 Atd. 469
(guest) ; Roche v. Sawyer, (1900) 176 Mass. 71, 57 N. E. 216; Harris v.
Lewistown Trust Co., (1937) 326 Pa. 145, 191 Atl. 34, 110 A. L. R. 749.
See Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord, (1928) 26 Mich. L. Rev.
260, 261; Eldredge, Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair, (1936) 84
U. Pa. L. Rev. 467, reprinted in Eldredge, Modern Tort Problems (1941)
ch. V.
135See Eldredge, Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair, (1936) 84
U. Pa. L. Rev. 467, reprinted in Eldredge, Modern Tort Problems (1941)
113, 129-156.
136Folkman v. Lauer, (1914) 244 Pa. St. 605, 91 Atl. 218; Warner v.
Lucey, (1923) 207 App. Div. 241, 201 N. Y. S. 658, aff'd (1924) 238 N. Y.
638, 144 N. E. 924.
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will be protected by an agreement that the public are not to be
admitted until the repairs have been made. 37
The earlier cases in which the question arose involved such
places as wharves and piers,138 theatres and other halls of enter-
tainment,3 9 grandstands,4 0 amusement parks,'41 beaches," and
hotels. 43 This has led the Restatement of the Law of Torts" to
limit the principle to leases "for purposes involving the admis-
sion of numerous persons," apparently requiring the entrance of a
large number of people at a time. No good reason for this limita-
tion ever has been suggested; and the courts have extended the
landlord's liability to premises leased for use as small shops,'"
a doctor's office,'" a garage, 4 7 a small public meeting,"'8 and a
"
7Beaman v. Grooms, (1917) 138 Tenn. 320, 197 S. IV. 1090, L. R. A.
1918B 305; Nickelsen v. Minneapolis, N. & S. R. Co., (1926) 168 Minn.
118, 209 N. W. 646.
s38Swords v. Edgar, (1874) 59 N. Y. 28, 17 Am. Rep. 295; Campbell
v. Portland Sugar Co., (1873) 62 Me. 552, 16 Am. Rep. 503; Albert v.
State to Use of Ryan, (1887) 66 Md. 325, 7 At. 697, 59 Am. Rep. 159;
Joyce v. Martin, (1887) 15 R. I. 558, 10 Ad. 629. Cf. Nugent v. Boston,
C. & Mf. R. Co., (1880) 80 Me. 62, 12 Aft. 797, 6 Am. St. Rep. 151 (rail-
way station).
139Oxford v. Leathe, (1896) 165 Mass. 254, 43 N. E. 92; Camp v.
Wood, (1879) 76 N. Y. 92, 32 Am. Rep. 282 (dance); Eckman v. Atlantic
Lodge, (1902) 68 N. J. L. 10, 52 At. 293 (public lodge ceremony) ; Fried-
man v. Richman, (1914) 85 Misc. Rep. 376, 147 N. Y. S. 461 (auditorium
leased to religious society); Lang v. Stadium Purchasing Corp., (1926)
216 App. Div. 558, 215 N. Y. S. 502 (motion picture theatre) ; Johnson v.
Zemel, (1932) 109 N. J. L. 197, 160 At. 356 (boxing exhibition).
l4OFox v. Buffalo Park, (1900) 163 N. Y. 559, 57 N. E. 1109, afFg(1897) 21 App. Div. 321, 47 N. Y. S. 788 (race track); Lusk v. Peck,(1909) 132 App. Div. 426, 116 N. Y. S. 1051, aff'd (1910) 199 N. Y. 546,
93 N. E. 377; Kane v. Lauer, (1913) 52 Pa. Super. 467; Folkman v. Lauer,
(1914) 244 Pa. St. 605, 91 At. 218; Tulsa Entertainment Co. v. Greenlees,(1922) 85 Okla. 113, 205 Pac. 179, 22 A. L. R. 602.
141Junkermann v. Tilyou Realty Co., (1915) 213 N. Y. 404, 108
N. E. 190, L. R. A. 1915F 700; Larson v. Calder's Park Co., (1919) 54
Utah 325, 180 Pac. 599, 4 A. L. R. 731.
'42Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beach Imp. Co., (1903) 174 N. Y. 310, 66
N. E. 968; Martin v. Asbury Park, (1933) 111 N. J. L. 364, 168 AU.
612 (bathing pavilion).
"3Colorado Mortgage & Inv. Co. v. Giacomini, (1913) 55 Colo. 540,
136 Pac. 1039, L. R. A. 1915B 364; Copley v. Balle, (1900) 9 KaMn. App.
465, 60 Pac. 656.
'"4Sec. 359.
'
45Turner v. Kent, (1932) 134 Kan. 574, 7 P. (2d) 513; Senner v. Dane-
wolf, (1932) 139 Or. 93, 6 P. (2d) 240; Webel v. Yale University, (1939)
125 Conn. 515, 7 A. (2d) 215, 123 A. L. R. 863. See also Murphy v.
Broadway Improvement Co., (1918) 189 App. Div. 692. 178 N. Y. S.
860; Lyman v. Herrmann, (1938) 203 Minn. 225, 280 N. WV. 862; Van
Avery v. Platte Valley L. & I. Co., (1937) 133 Neb. 314, 275 N. W. 288;
Wilson v. Dowtin, (1939) 215 N. C. 547, 2 S. E. (2d) 576. Contra:
Bender v. Weber, (1913) 250 Mo. 51, 157 S. W. 570, 46 L. L A. (N.S.)
121; Clark v. Chase Hotel Co., (1934) 230 Mo. App. 739, 74 S. IV. (2d)
498 (Turkish bath).
'46Gilligan v. Blakesley, (1933) 92 Colo. 370, 26 P. (2d) 808.
147Warner v. Lucey, (1923) 207 App. Div. 241, 201 N. Y. S. 658,
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boarding house.1"9 In fact, it appears that any premises intended
to be used for the purpose of inviting the general public to enter
will come under the duty, although it obviously does not arise
in the case of a warehouse leased for private storage,"' or a
private pier. 1 ' In only two cases' 52 has the question of the land-
lord's rent played any part; and since the duty does not arise
toward the tenant who pays the rent, but toward the visitor who
does not, it would seem that the Oklahoma court' is correct in
holding that the lessor may be liable even when he donates the
premises for the admission of the public. As Judge Cardozo has
said,' -4 it is simply the public use to which the land is put which
is the source of the duty.
The landlord's responsibility extends only to those parts of
the premises which are to be thrown open to the public,", and
he is not liable for any public use not contemplated by the
lease. 56 Neither is he liable, regardless of his rent, to anyone
who does not come for the purpose for which the premises are
to be open to the public; and a loafer in a saloon has no better
aff'd (1924) 238 N. Y. 638, 144 N. E. 924. Accord, Standard Oil Co. v.
Decell, (1936) 175 Miss. 251, 166 So. 379 (gasoline filling station).
'
4SHowe v. Jameson, (N.H. 1940) 13 A. (2d) 471 (domestic science
sessions).
149Stenberg v. Willcox, (1896) 96 Tenn. 163, 33 S. W. 917, 34
L. R. A. 615 (the language of the court extends a great deal beyond the
facts) ; Lucas v. Brown, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 361.
15oCampbell v. Elsie S. Holding Co., (1929) 251 N. Y. 446, 167
N. E. 582. Cf. De Motte v. Arkell, (1926) 77 Cal. App. 610, 247 Pac.
254 (private lodge meeting).
15'Lafredo v. Bush Terminal Co., (1933) 261 N. Y. 323, 185 N. E. 398
1521n Davis v. Schmitt Bros., (1922) 199 App. Div. 683, 192 N. Y. S.
15, and Karlowski v. Kissock, (1931) 275 Mass. 180, 175 N. E. 500,
where the premises were donated for charity, it was held that there was
no duty upon the donor because he received no benefit. The customers were
said to stand in no better position than the donee.
153Tulsa Entertainment Co. v. Greenlees, (1922) 85 Okla. 113, 205
Pac. 179, 22 A. L. R. 602. Accord, Restatement of the Law of Torts,
sec. 359, Comment d.
154"We may say more simply, and perhaps more wisely, rejecting the
fiction of invitation, that the nature of the use itself creates the duty, and
that an owner is just as much bound to repair a structure that endangers
travelers on a walk in an amusement park as he is to repair a structure
that endangers travelers on a highway." Cardozo, J., in Junkermann v.
Tilyou Realty Co., (1915) 213 N. Y. 404, 408-409, 108 N. E. 190, L. R. A.
1915F 700.
155Wilson v. Dowtin (1939) 215 N. C. 547, 2 S. E. (2d) 576;
Van Avery v. Platte Valley Land & Investment Co., (1937) 133 Neb.
314, 275 N. W. 288; Kelly v. McGreevy, (1918) 182 App. Div. 584, 169
N. Y. S. 923.
156Edwards v. New York & H. R. Co., (1885) 98 N. Y. 245, 50 Am.
Rep. 659.
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case against the lessor than against the lessee.13 In this connec-
tion, it is interesting to find the New Jersey court'0 5 holding
that the lessor -was not liable when a dwelling house was leased
to a doctor to be used as his office, on the ground that it must
be obvious to any visitor that the building was not designed
for the purpose, and so it was not held out to the public as
fit for it.
A comparison may be made here with the rule which holds
a landlord responsible, when he leases different parts of an
office building or an apartment house to separate tenants, for the
safe condition of approaches, stairs and other "common passage-
ways" used by all the tenants. It is the prevailing American rule,
although there is authority to the contrary," 9 that this duty
extends even to social guests of the tenants,10 to whom the lessee
himself would not be responsible on the premises leased. The
reason usually given is that the lessor has retained "control" over
the passageway; but this does not explain why he should owe a
duty to visitors who confer no financial benefit upon anyone.
Nor is it a matter of the tenant's rent, since there is no such duty
to the guest when he is inside of the apartment. The explanation
may be suggested, that the lessor has held out such parts of the
premises as open and provided for the use of anyone coming
for all usual and customary visits to his tenants, and that to
that extent he has made them a public place. A canvasser,0 1 a
solicitor for charity,'62 or an uninvited interloper who comes out
of curiosity to see a wake,163 are not invited by any representa-
157Kneiser v. Belasco-Blackvood Co., (1913) 22 Cal. App. 205, 133
Pac. 989. Accord, Restatement of the Law of Torts, sec. 359, Comment b
(delivering provisions, etc.)
'
5
sLa Freda v. Woodward, (1940) 125 N. J. L. 489, 15 A. (2d) 798,
130 A- L. R. 1299.
159Alessi v. Fitzgerald, (1914) 217 Mass. 576, 105 N. E. 437, L. R. A.
1916F 1135; O'Neill v. Gear Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, (1931) 9 N. J. Misc.
1084, 156 Atl. 460.
36OGibson v. Hoppman, (1928) 108 Conn. 401, 143 At. 635, 75 A. L. R.
148; Gallagher v. Murphy, (1916) 221 Mass. 363, 10 N. E. 1081, Ann.
Cas. 1917E 594; Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co., (1940) 72 App. D. C. 141,
112 F. (2d) 577; see Gleason v. Boehm, (1896) 58 N. J. L. 475, 34 Atl.
886, 32 L. R. A. 645; cf. Bowers v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., (1940)
282 N. Y. 442, 26 N. E. (2d) 970 (roof). Accord, Restatement of the
Law of Torts, sec. 360.
161 Stacy v. Shapiro, (1925) 212 App. Div. 723, 209 N. Y. S. 305;
Reuter v. Kenmore Bldg. Co., (1934) 153 Misc. Rep. 646, 276 N. Y. S.
545; see Hart v. Cole, (1892) 156 Mass. 475, 31 N. E. 644, 16 L. R. A.
557 (as to pedlars).
162Jones v. Asa G. Candler, Inc. (1918) 22 Ga. App. 717, 97 S. E. 112.
163Hart v. Cole, (1892) 156 Mass. 475, 31 N. E. 644, 16 L. R. A. 557.
Cf. Ganley v. Hall, (1897) 168 Mass. 513, 47 N. E. 416 (seeking to
borrow money); Medcraft v. Merchants Exchange, (1931) 211 Cal. 404,
295 Pac. 822 (using toilet in office building).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tion that the premises are provided for that purpose; and even as
to the landlord they remain licensees.
In short, the conclusion is that whenever premises are thrown
open and held out to the public as provided for public admission,
there is an implied representation 0 4 that care has been taken to
prepare them and make them safe for the purpose for which they
are open; and a duty to take such care is assumed toward anyone
who comes for that purpose, regardless of whether he brings
with him any potentiality of profit, benefit, advantage or gain. The
duty is a public one, and it does not differ essentially from the
obligation not to endanger the safety of members of the public
on the highway. It is entirely possible to regard it as a mere
extension of that obligation to the public invited to enter from
the street.
PRIVATE INVITATION
Cases of private invitation have been rather less frequent,
although two of the earliest of them0 5 have received perhaps
undue attention. A private "invitation" or permission to enter
is one which is extended to the individual only, and is not
shared by the public at large. It follows that the individual can-
not rest his claim upon any representation made or any duty
owed to him as one of the public, but must look to his personal
relation with the occupier as the source of the obligation to
protect him. The purpose for which he comes is again highly
important; but the circumstances under which he enters, and
the understanding to be implied from them, are more important
still, and there is a great deal of variation according to the
individual case.
There may be a private invitation to enter for a private pur-
pose upon premises open for other purposes to the public-as in
the case of a social visit to an innkeeper,0 or a contractor and
his workmen hired to make repairs in a railway station, a hotel,
or a department store. On the other hand, premises otherwise
164That this is the basis of liability is indicated by the holding that
where premises are open to the public, but do not appear to be so, and the
visitor does not know it, no duty arises. Stevens v. Nichols, (1892) 155
Mass. 472, 29 N. E. 1150, 15 L. R. A. 459. Cf. La Freda v. Woodward,
(1940) 125 N. J. L. 489, 15 A. (2d) 798, 130 A. L. R. 1299. Or when the
defendant is not responsible for appearances. Conroy v. Allison Storage
Warehouse Co., (Mass. 1935) 197 N. E. 454.
10 5 Southcote v. Stanley, (1856) 1 H. & N. 247, 24 L. J. Ex. 339;
Indermaur v. Dames, (1866) L. R. 1 C. P. 274, 35 L. J. C. P. 184,
aff'd (1867) L. R. 2 C. P. 311, 36 L. J. C. P. 181.
166Southcote v. Stanley, (1856) 1 H. & N. 247, 24 L. J. Ex. 339.
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entirely private may be thrown open to the public for a particular
purpose, as in the case of an advertisement for purchasers or
tenants,1 7 or a reward offered to anyone who can find a well on
a farm.6 3 There are even a few cases, with none to the contrary,
indicating that anyone who provides a walk leading from the
street to his house, with front steps and a doorbell, thereby
opens them to the public to the extent that he becomes respon-
sible for their safe condition to any passer-by who enters to use
them for any legitimate purpose for which they appear to be
designed, such as to ask his way.169 For private invitation we
must look, then, to premises or parts of premises not open to the
public, or to those who enter for purposes for which the public
is not invited.
The earliest case" 0 of private invitation was that of a social
guest; and ever since social guests have been held to be mere
licensees.'"' Now a social guest is invited; he usually is besought
and urged to come. So far as benefit to the occupier is concerned,
it would not be particularly difficult to find it in the pleasure
which his visit confers; and if this has no pecuniary value, neither
has the benefit to a municipality from the use of a public park.
If the guest should bring a Christmas present, or if in the course of
his visit he were to lose money to his host at poker or bridge,
or to offer to buy an antique vase, it may be doubted very seriously
'16 See supra, notes 100, 101.
'
68Bush v. Weed Lumber Co., (1921) 55 Cal. App. 588, 204 Pac. 24,
reaffirmed in (1923) 63 Cal. App. 426, 218 Pac. 618.
169There are at least dicta to this effect in Gillis v. Pennsylvania R.
Co,. (1868) 59 Pa. St. 129, 98 Am. Dec. 317 (dictum); Phillips v. Library
Co. of Burlington, (1893) 55 N. 3. L. 307, 27 Ad. 478 (visitor at meeting) ;
Fogarty v. Bogert, (1910) 59 App. Div. 114, 69 N. Y. S. 47 (asking
directions); Learoyd v. Godfrey, (1885) 138 Mass. 315 (policeman);
Weidman v. Consolidated Gas E. L. & P. Co., (1929) 158 Md. 39, 148
Ad. 270 (taking refuge in doorway). Compare also Johnson v. Glasier,(1918) 40 S. D. 13,.166 N. W. 154 (accompanying one delivering milk on
path leading to hospital) ; Green v. Green, (1925) 212 App. Div. 381, 208
N. Y. S. 689 (social guest on front steps) ; Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery,(1920) 229 N. Y. 10, 127 N. E. 491, 13 A. L. H. 633 (fireman on drive-
way); Corby v. Hill, (1858) 4 C. B. (N.S.) 556, 27 L. J. C. P. 318(public asylum); Toomey v. Sanborn, (1888) 146 Mass. 28, 14 N. E.
921 (garbage collector). There seems to be at least some indication of
this view in Marsh v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 182.
99 N. W. 630.
l7OSouthcote v. Stanley, (1856) 1 H. & N. 247, 24 L. J. Ex. 339.
17'Greenfield v. Miller, (1921) 173 Wis. 184, 180 N. IV. 834, 12
A. L. R. 984; Comeau v. Comeau, (1933) 285 Mass. 578, 189 N. E. 585,
92 A. L. R. 1002; Page v. Murphy, (1935) 194 Minn. 607, 261 N. IV. 443;
Gregory v. Loder, (1936) 116 N. J. L. 451, 185 At. 360; Lewis V. Dear,(1938) 120 N. J. L. 244, 198 At. 887; Colgrave v. Malstrom, (NJ. 1941)
23 A- (2d) 288; see McCulloch v. Horton, (1936) 102 Mont. 135, 56 P.
(2d) 1344.
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that his status would suddenly be changed. The attempt of the
supreme court of Montana"' to find economic advantage in the
fact that the guest has opened the garage door for his host ap-
pears distinctly naive. Why, then, is such a guest not in legal
terms an "invitee?" The reason the courts have given is the simple
one, that the guest understands when he comes that he is to be
placed on the same footing as one of the family, and must take
the premises as the occupier himself uses them, without any
preparations made for his safety; that he assumes the risk of
defective conditions unknown to the occupier, and is entitled
at most to a warning of dangers that are known. Whether or
not this is in accord with present social customs and the general
ideas of hosts and guests on the subject,'7 3 it at least indicates that
it is the terms on which the invitation is given which are important,
rather than the invitation itself.
The same explanation holds good in the case of a long list
of persons who are permitted to make use of private premises
gratuitously for their own purposes, whether it be by formal
invitation or by bare permission of the occupier. Private visitors
on a tour through a factory not open to the public, 74 those on
social or personal business visits to employees, 75 a child who
comes with his sister on business at a private home,'17 a discharged
"'McCulloch v. Horton, (1936) 102 Mont. 135, 56 P. (2d) 1344. Cf.
Hatcher v. Cantrell, (1933) 16 Tenn. App. 544, 65 S. W. (2d) 247 (volun-
teer helping to get car out of garage to avoid fire).
In Colgrave v. Malstrom, (N.J. 1941) 23 A. (2d) 288, the social guest
gave incidental advice concerning the purchase of bed coverings. The
court rejected the contention that the "benefit" thus conferred made her
an invitee, saying: "The defendant's premises constituted her home. They
were used as a home and for nothing else. Everything that was done there
radiated about the idea of home. The dog, the backyard, the kitchen porch,
the bedroom, the comforter, the visit, the inspection-all these things and
acts were incidental to the home. We think that the familiar and homely
custom of back door calling by neighbor upon neighbor may not be sodelicately refined and distinguished; otherwise adroit reasoning could spell
a benefit to the inviter out of practically every invitation 'to come and
see' and the 'guest' rule would be quickly whittled away."
173 McCleary, The Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri toPersons Injured While on the Land, (1936) 1 Mo. L. Rev. 45, 58, doubts
this: "It is customary for possessors to prepare as carefully, if not more
carefully, for social guests as for business guests; furthermore, the social
guest has reasons to believe that his host will either make conditions safe
or at least warn of hidden dangers. In this century there is no reason for
the courts to take the position that a social guest should not sue his host."
174See supra, note 95.
175See supra, notes 103-105. Cf. Lange v. St. Johns Lbr. Co., (1925)
115 Or. 337, 237 Pac. 696 (social guest of captain of boat moored at
private dock). I
170 Burchell v. Hickisson, (1880) 50 L. J. Q. B. 101.
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servant allowed to sleep in a hotel over night, 7 ' one who comes
to borrow a tool'7 8 or the use of a prune drier7  or a grindstone,'"0
to learn weaving on the defendant's machines,"' to use a toilet not
open to the public, 18 2 to mail a letter in the defendant's box,'"
to remove his own property from a building under construc-
tion,"' or to pick up and remove refuse'8 -- all have been held
to be -only licensees. The use of the premises is understood to be
received as a gift; a gift horse is not to be looked in the mouth,
and the visitor has no reasonable expectation that care has been
taken to make the place safe for the purpose.
In direct contrast to such cases is IRdermiaur v. Dames,"
where the plaintiff was a gasfitter in the service of an independent
contractor, who came to make repairs in the interior of the de-
fendant's factory. IHe entered in the performance of a contract,
which carried an obligation on the part of the defendant, not
only to pay but also to furnish the place for the work to be done.
There is obvious analogy to the defendant's own servants, md
his duty to provide them with a safe place to work. Like tie
servant, the plaintiff had reason to expect reasonable care, and
like the servant he did not assume the risk of conditions of
which he had no knowledge. Since this decision independent con-
tractors'8 7 and their servants 88 doing work on the occupier's
'
77Morrison v. Hotel Rutledge Co., (1922) 200 App. Div. 636, 193
N. Y. S. 428.78Laporta v. New York Central R. Co., (1916) 224 Mass. 100. 112
N. E. 643.1'7Aguilar v. Riverdale Cooperative Creamery Ass'n, (1930) 104 Cal.
App. 263, 285 Pac. 889. Cf. Vargas v. Blue Seal Bottling Works, (1930)
12 La. App. 652, 126 So. 707 (salesman watching competing machine).lSOForbrick v. General Electric Co., (1904) 45 Misc. Rep. 452, 92
N. Y. S. 36. Accord, Inman v. Home Tel. & Tel. Co., (1919) 105 Wash.
234, 177 Pac. 234 (telephone).8'8 Rego v. Sagamore Mfg. Co., (Mass. 1940) 25 N. E. (2d) 729.
'
82See supra, note 132; also Vaughan v. Transit Development Co..(1917) 222 N. Y. 79, 118 N. E. 219; Kinsman v. Barton & Co., (1926)
141 Wash. 311, 251 Pac. 563.183Brosnan v. Koufman, (1936) 294 Mass. 495, 2 N. E. (2d) 441,
104 A. L. R. 1177. Cf. O'Brien v. Harvard Restaurant & Liquor Co.,(Mass. 1941) 38 N. E. (2d) 658 (pay telephone in basement).184Worshan v. Dempster, (1923) 148 Tenn. 267, 255 S. W. 52.
'
8 5Lavoie v. Nashua Gummer & Coated Paper Co., (1918) 79 N. H.
97, 105 AtI. 4; Cowart v. Meeks, (Tex. Comm. App. 1938) 111 S. W.(2d) 1105. See also the cases of tolerated visitors, supra, notes 52, 58.
386(1866) L. R. 1 C. P. 274, 35 L. J. C. P. 184, atFd (1867) L. R. 2
C. P. 311, 36 L. J. C. P. 181.
T87Hagen v. Schlenter, (1908) 236 Ill. 467, 86 N. E. 112. 22 L. R. A.(N.S.) 856; Allen v. Bear Creek Coal Co., (1911) 43 'Mont. 269. 115
Pac. 673; Benoit Coal Min. Co. v. Faught, (1918) 201 Ala. 169, 77 So.
695; Arizona Binghampton Copper Co. v. Dickson, (1921) 22 Ariz. 163.
195 Pac. 538, 44 A. L. R. 881; Happertz v. The Jerseyman, (1923) 98
N. J. L. 836, 121 At. 718; Polony v. James Brady's Sons' Co., (N.J.
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premises have been held without dissent to be "invitees," whether
in business establishments or in private homes.ls 9 The same
reasoning applies in the case of those delivering goods purchased,
at places of business'50 or private dwellings;"" to one who comes
to a farm to buy grain,"' or pays for the privilege of dumping
refuse, 9 ' or for the use of a road by maintaining it,"" or assists
a janitor in return for his room and board;"" and it applies
1924) 126 Atl. 675; Painter v. Hudson Trust Co., (N.J. 1924) 126 Atl.
636 (removing telephone) ; see Stein v. Battenfield Oil & Grease Co.,
(1931) 327 Mo. 804, 39 S. W. (2d) 345.
'
88Dobbie v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., (1928) 95 Cal. App. 781, 273
Pac. 630; Webster Mfg. Co. v. Mulvanny, (1897) 168 Ill. 311, 48 N. E.
168; Hogan v. Arbuckle, (1902) 73 App. Div. 591, 77 N. Y. S. 22;
Stevens v. United Gas & Electric Co., (1905) 73 N. H. 159, 60 Atl. 8,18,
70 L. R. A. 119; Ryan v. St. Louis Transit Co., (1905) 190 Mo. 621, 89
S. W. 865, 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 777; North American Restaurant & Oyster
House v. McElligott, (1907) 227 Ill. 317, 81 N. E. 388; Jewell v. Kansas
City Bolt & Nut Co., (1910) 231 Mo. 176, 132 S. W. 703, 140 Am. St.
Rep. 515; Middleton v. P. Sanford Ross, Inc., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1914) 213
Fed. 6; Hall v. Thayer, (1916) 225 Mass. 151, 113 N. E. 644; Weber v.
City Water Co., (1917) 206 Ill. App. 417; Houlihan v. Sulzberger & Sons
Co., (1918) 282 Ill. 76, 118 N. E. 429; Carr v. Wallace Laundry Co.,
(1918) 31 Idaho 266, 170 Pac. 107; Lincoln v. Appalachian Corp., (1919)
146 La. 23, 83 So. 364, 7 A. L. R. 1697; Davis Bakery v. Dozier,
(1924) 139 Va. 628, 124 S. E. 411.
""aPritchard v. Peto, [1917] 2 K. B. 173, 86 L. J. K. B. 1292 (news
vendor collecting bill); Lamberton v. Fish, (Mo. 1941) 148 S. W. (2d)
544 (fixing gas range); Clark v. Fehlhaber, (1907) 106 Va. 803, 56 S. E.
817, 13 L. R. A. (N.S.) 442 (dressmaker); Ellington v. Ricks, (1920)
179 N. C. 686, 102 S. E. 510 (installing gas generator) ; Haefeli v. Wood-
rich Engineering Co., (1931) 255 N. Y. 442, 175 N. E. 123.
19ONew York Lubricating Oil Co. v. Pusey, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1914)
211 Fed. 622; Miller v. Brewster, (1898) 32 App. Div. 559, 53 N. Y. S.
1; Morten Inv. Co. v. Trevey, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 8 S. W. (2d) 1527;
Wilbourn v. Charleston Cooperage Co., (1921) 127 Miss. 290, 90 So. 91;
Robb v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., (1921) 269 Pa. St. 298, 112 At. 459;
Madigan v. 0. A. Hale Co., (1928) 90 Cal. App. 151, 265 Pac. 574;
Buckingham v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co.. (1932) 128 Cal. App. 94. 16
P. (2d) 807; Kurre v. Graham Ship By Truck Co., (1932) 136 Kan.
356, 15 P. (2d) 463; Eggert v. Mutual Grocery Co., (1933) 111 N. J. L
502, 168 Atl. 312; Riggs v. Pan-American Wall Paper & Paint Co.
(1939) 225 Iowa 1051, 283 N. W. 250; Johnson v. Glasier, (1918) 40
S. D. 13, 166 N. W. 154. Accord, as to picking up goods purchased: Wilson
v. Olano, (1898) 28 App. Div. 448, 51 N. Y. S. 109; Kulka v. Neemrovsky,
(1934) 314 Pa. St. 134, 170 Atl. 261 ; Strong v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 1939)
34 Cal. App. (2d) 335, 93 P. (2d) 649.
19The Ansonia v. Sullivan, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1917) 239 Fed. 296;
Adams v. Misena Realty Co., (1933) 239 App. Div. 633, 267 N. Y. S.
869; Konick v. Champneys, (1919) 108 Wash. 35, 183 Pac. 75, 6
A. L. R. 459.
192See Pierce v. Whitcomb, (1875) 48 Vt. 127, 21 Am. Rep. 120;
Finch v. W. R. Roach Co., (Mich. 1941) 1 N. W. (2d) 46 (picking cherries
purchased).
"93Fishang v. Eyermann Contracting Co., (1933) 333 Mo. 874, 63
S. W. (2d) 30; Jackson v. Quarry Realty Co., (Mo. App. 1921) 231
S. W. 1063.
194Sills v. Forbes, (1939) 33 Cal. App. (2d) 219, 91 P. (2d) 246.
"95Marino v. Farrell, (1922) 201 App. Div. 367, 194 N. Y. S. 356.
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equally to one who comes to estimate costs before a contract is
actually made.198
It is here that business interest, or benefit, plays its legitimate
part. It is not the fact that benefit is conferred which is decisive,
but the fact that it is conferred in the expectation of a return, an
obligation to provide a safe place to confer it. If the benefit is
given -without such expectation induced, as in the case of volunteer
assistance, it is held very generally that the volunteer is not
entitled to protection. 9 7 It is only where such assistance is ren-
dered under circumstances -which indicate that the plaintiff is
accepted on the footing of a gratuitous servant, and so impliedly
assured that he will be protected," 8 or where he has some other
reason to expect protection in return,19 9 that he is regarded as
more than a licensee.
There are many cases of customers and others who enter
parts of premises not open to the public, for the purpose of the
196See Mazey v. Loveland, (1916) 133 Minn. 210, 158 N. W. 44,
L. R. A. 1916F 279; Grill v. Gutfreund, (1909) 65 Misc. Rep. 506, 120
N. Y. S. 86. Cf. Armour & Co. v. Rose, (Ark. 1931) 36 S. W. (2d) 70
(business on Sunday).
'
9 7Billows v. Moors, (1894) 162 Mass. 42, 37 N. E. 750; Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Lindley, (1889) 42 IKan. 714, 22 Pac. 703, 6 L. R. A.
646, 16 Am. St. Rep. 515; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Argo, (1898) 82
Ill. App. 667; Wagen v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., (1900) 80 Alinn. 92,
82 N. W. 1107; Mickelson v. New East Tintic R. Co., (1900) 23 Utah 42,
64 Pac. 463; Atlantic & W. P. R. Co., (1905) 121 Ga. 641, 49 S. E. 711,
67 L. R. A. 701, 104 Am. St. Rep. 179; Vassor v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., (1906) 142 N. C. 68, 54 S. E. 849, 7 L. R. A. (N.S.) 950, 9 Ann.
Cas. 535; Taylor v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (1908) 108 Va. 817, 62 S. E.
798; Grissom v. Atlanta & B. A. L. R. Co., (1907) 152 Ala. 110, 44 So.
661, 13 L. R. A. (N.S.) 561, 126 Am. St. Rep. 20; Derrickson v. Swann-
Day Lbr. Co., (Ky. 1909) 115 S. W. 191; Richardson v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1910) 175 Fed. 897; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Mullins,
(1910) 7 Ga. App. 381; Mallory v. Day Carpet & Furn. Co. (1927)
245 IIl. App. 465 (good statement); Langan v. Tyler, (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1902) 114 Fed. 716; Smedley v. Mashek Chemical & Iron Co., (1915) 189
Mich. 64, 155 N. W. 537 (putting out fire).
3 9SThis is of course a matter of the particular facts. Supornick v.
Supornick, (1928) 175 Minn. 579, 222 N. W. 275; Nevada Transfer &
Warehouse Co. v. Peterson, (1940) 60 Nev. 87, 99 P. (2d) 633; Button Y.
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., (1894) 87 Wis. 63, 57 N. W. 1110; Tucker v.
Buffalo Cotton Mills, (1907) 76 S. C. 539, 57 S. E. 626, 121 Am. St. Rep.
957.
l99GraY v. Foundation Co., (1922) 151 La. 7, 91 So. 527 (expert
inspecting ship-launching); Henry W. Cross Co. v. Burns, (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1936) 81 F. (2d) 856 (giving advice on how to run plant); Welch
v. Maine Central R. Co., (1894) 86 Me. 552, 30 At. 116, 25 L. 1. A. 658
(workmen assisting for benefit of their own employer) ; Mclntire Street R.
Co. v. Bolton, (1885) 43 Ohio St. 224, 1 N. E. 333, 54 Am. Rep. 803 (pas-
senger assisting in order to continue journey) ; Louisville & N. R. Co. Y.
Ward, (1897) 98 Tenn. 123, 38 S. W. 727, 60 Am. St. Rep. 848 (employee
of shipper assisting to move cars).
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business for which other parts are open. If they go behind tile
counter, or into a storeroom to look for goods, with the invitation
or encouragement of the occupier, they are held to be invitees ;200
but if they go on their own initiative, without such encouragement,
they are no better than licensees.201 The potential benefit, the
possibility that the excursion will result in a purchase, would
appear to be the same in either case. The difference, which the
Restatement 0 2 again has described as one of "area of business
invitation," is merely one of whether the visitor has been led to
expect that the premises have been made safe for his reception.
When we turn to public officers and employees who enter
in the performance of their duties, it becomes even more difficult
to account for the cases on any theory of benefit. Pecuniary
advantage is perhaps not impossible to spell out in the case of
sanitary 03 and safety0 4 inspectors, a garbage collector,20  a city
2 0OHupfer v. National Distilling Co., (1902) 114 Wis. 279, 90 N. W.
191; Sefler v. Vanderbeek & Sons, (1915) 88 N. J. L. 636, 96 Atl. 1009;
Withers v. Brooklyn Real Estate Exchange, (1905) 106 App. Div. 255,
94 N. Y. S. 328 (prospective tenant); Roth v. G. A. Field Co., (1908)
59 Misc. Rep. 214, 110 N. Y. S. 427; Foley v. Hornung, (1917) 35
Cal. App. 304, 169 Pac. 705; Smith v. Pickwick Stages System, (1931)
113 Cal. App. 118, 297 Pac. 940 (passenger going back to look for purse) ;
Nelson v. F. W. Woolworth Co., (1930) 211 Iowa 592, 231 N. W. 665;
Southern Express Co. v. Williamson, (1913) 66 Fla. 286, 63 So. 433; cf.
League v. Stradley, (1903) 68 S. C. 515, 47 S. E. 975 (packages left
behind counter) ; New York Lubricating Oil Co. v. Pusey, (C.C.A. 2d
Cir. 1914) 211 Fed. 622; John v. B. B. McGinnis Co., (Cal App. 1940)
99 P. (2d) 323; Rudlen v. Bridgeman, [1930] 3 Dom. L. Rep. 224.201Lerman Bros. v. Lewis, (1939) 277 Ky. 334, 126 S. W. (2d) 461
(hunting for particular saleswoman) ; Wall v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,
(1925) 209 Ky. 258, 272 S. W. 730 (through gate); Coberth v. Great A.
& P. Tea Co., (1911) 36 App. D. C. 569 (no permission) ; Keeran v.
Spurgeon Merc. Co., (1922) 194 Iowa 1240, 191 N. W. 99, 27 A. L. R.
579 (getting coat left as an accommodation) ; Gordon Sleeprite Corp. v.
Walker, (1933) 165 Md. 354, 168. Ati. 846 (bill collector entering plant) ;
Wilson v. Goodrich, (1934) 218 Iowa 462, 252 N. W. 142 (doctor enter-
ing plant) ; Southwest Cotton Co. v. Pope, (1923) 25 Ariz. 364, 218 Pae.
152 (salesman out of office) ; Wolf v. Hotel Operating Associates, (1920)
180 N. Y. S. 547 (same) ; Trask v. Shotwell, (1889) 41 Minn. 66, 42
N. W. 699 (driver in shipping room) ; Scanlon v. United Cigar Stores Co.,(1917) 228 Mass. 481, 117 N. E. 840.
20 2Sec. 343, Comment b.
203Cudahy Packing Co. v. McBride, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1937) 92 F.
(2d) 737; Mitchell v. Barton & Co., (1923) 126 Wash. 232, 217 Pac. 993:
Boneau v. Swift & Co., (Mo. App. 1934) 66 S. W. (2d) 172; cf. Brody v.
Cudahy Packing Co., (Mo. App. 1939) 127 S. W. (2d) 7 (kosher
slaughterer) ; Hyatt v. Murray, (1907) 101 Minn. 507, 112 N. W. 881
(official log-sealer). See (1938) 22 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 898.204Fred Howland, Inc. v. Morris, (Fla. 1940) 196 So. 472, 128 A. L. R.
1013; Christy v. Ulrich, (1931) 113 Cal. App. 338, 298 Pac. 135; Robey v.
Keller, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 790; Ross v. Becklenberg.
(1917) 209 Ill. App. 144; Fry v. Brubecker, (1920) 29 Pa. Dist. 893;
McCormack v. Windsor, (1931) 9 N. J. Misc. 543, 154 Atl. 765; Pickwick
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water meter reader, -2 0 6 or a postman207-- although as to the last
it becomes rather strained if he is the bearer of bad tidings in
the form of a claim for damages, and the ordinary citizen would
regard it as equally fanciful in the case of a customs - s or tax200
collector. At least such people know that the occupier is required
by law to receive them, and so have reason to believe that their
coming is anticipated, and that the premises are ready for their
reception; and so they are properly held to be invitees. Firemen- 10
and policemen, 211 on the other band, are held almost uniformly
v. McCauliff, (1906) 193 Mass. 70, 78 N. E. 730, 8 Ann. Cas. 1041; The
City of Naples, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1895) 69 Fed. 794 (grain inspector);
Mackintosh Co. v. Wells, (1928) 218 Ala. 260, 118 So. 276 (paving inspector).
Cf. Dashields v. W. B. Moses & Sons, (1910) 35 App. D. C. 583, 31 L. R. A.(N.S.) 380 (insurance company's inspector) ; Bentley & Gerwig v. Loverock,
(1902) 102 Ill. App. 167 (same); St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v.
Williams, (1936) 176 Okla. 465, 56 P. (2d) 815 (gratuitous inspection by
policeman); San Angelo Water, L. & P. Co. v. Anderson, (Te.x. Civ.
App. 1922) 244 S. W. 571 (same).205Toomey v. Sanborn, (1888) 146 Mass. 28, 14 N. E. 921.206Finnegan v. Fall River Gas Works, (1893) 159 Mass. 311, 34 N. E.
523; Kennedy v. Heisen, (1913) 182 I1. App. 200.207Paubel v. Hitz, (1936) 339 Mo. 274, 96 S. W. (2d) 369; Sutton v.
Penn, (1925) 238 Ill. App. 182; Gordon v. Cummings, (1890) 152 Mass.
513, 25 N. E. 978, 9 L. R. A. 640, 23 Am. St. Rep. 846. See (1926) 26 Col.
L. Rev. 116; (1937) 2 Mo. L. Rev. 110.208Low v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (1881) 72 Me. 313, 24 Am. Rep.
331; Wilson v. Union Iron Works Dry Dock Co., (1914) 167 Cal. 539,
140 Pac. 250.209Anderson & Nelson Distilling Co. v. Hair, (1898) 103 Ky. 196, 44
S. W. 658, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1822.
21OGreat Central R. Co. v. Bates, [1921] 3 K. B. 578, 90 L. J. K. B.
1269; Gibson v. Leonard, (1892) 143 Il1. 182, 32 N. E. 182, 17 L. R. A.
588, 36 Am. St. Rep. 376; Woodruff v. Bowen, (1893) 136 Ind. 431, 34
N. E. 1113, 22 L. R. A. 198; Beehler v. Daniels, (1894) 18 R. 1. 563, 29
Atl. 6, 27 L. R. A. 512, 49 Am. St. Rep. 790, reaffirmed in (1895) 19
R. I. 49, 31 Atl. 582; Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., (1899) 78
Minn. 3, 80 N. W. 693; Eckles v. Stefler, (1904) 98 App. Div. 76, 90
N. Y. S. 473; New Omaha Thomson-Houston Elec. Light Co. v. Anderson,(1905) 73 Neb. 84, 102 N. V. 89; Lunt v. Post Printing & Pub. Co.,(1910) 48 Colo. 316, 110 Pac. 203, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.). 60, 21 Ann. Cas.
492; Litch v. White, (1911) 160 Cal. 497, 117 Pac. 515; Houston Belt &
Term. Co. v. O'Leary, (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 136 S. IV. 601; Penne-
baker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co., (1910) 158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac.
459, 31 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1099, 139 Am. St. Rep. 202; Volluz v. East St.
Louis L. & P. Co., (1918) 210 Ill. App. 565; Eckert v. Refiners Oil Co.,
(1923) 17 Ohio App. 221; Steinwedel v. Hilbert, (1925) 149 Md. 121, 131
Atl. 44; Todd v. Armour & Co., (1932) 44 Ga. App. 609, 162 S. E. 394;
Aldworth v. F. V"r. Voolworth Co., (1936) 295 Mass. 344, 3 N. E. (2d)
1008; CAmpbell v. Pure Oil Co., (1937) 15 N. J. Misc. 723, 194 At. 873;
Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., (1939) 257 App. Div. 228, 12
N. Y. S. (2d) 739. Cf. Smedley v. Mashek Chemical & Iron Co., (1915)
189 Mich. 64; 155 N. W. 537 (individual volunteer).
211Berry v. Boston Elev. R. Co., (1905) 188 Mass. 536, 74 N. E.
933; Creedon v. Boston & Me. R. Co., (1906) 193 Mass. 280, 79 N. E.
344, 9 Ann. Cas. 1121; Casey v. Adams, (1908) 234 Ill. 350, 84 N. E.
933, 17 L. R A. (N. S.) 776, 123 Am. St. Rep. 105; Thrift v. Vandalia
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to enter under a bare license, and to be entitled at most to dis-
closure of known dangers. It is surely absurd to say that a fire-
man who comes to extinguish a blaze in the defendant's building,
or a policeman who comes to prevent a burglary, confers no
economic advantage; and his invitation is certainly clear enough
when he enters in response to a desperate call for help.212
It seems evident that in all of these cases neither benefit nor
invitation has played any important part; and it has been pointed
out' 1 that the occupier's "invitation," or his conduct in the matter,
can make no difference, since the officer enters in the performance
of a public duty, and would enter even if the defendant made
active objection. Granted that this is true, the question remains
as to what he may reasonably expect to find when he comes.
Why, then, are visiting firemen and policemen set apart as a
class to whom no duty is owed to inspect and prepare the prem-
ises? One obvious reason, which has been mentioned in nearly all
of the cases, is that these individuals enter at unforeseeable
moments, upon unusual parts of the premises, and under circum-
stances of emergency, where care in preparation cannot reason-
ably be looked for. A man who climbs in through a basement
window in search of a fire or a thief cannot expect an assurance
that he will not find a bulldog in the cellar. Regardless of benefit
or invitation, there is no reason to suppose that the place has been
made safe. It is worthy of note that in every one of the cases in
which recovery has been denied to such plaintiffs, some such
element of unusual and unexpected entry has been present.
If this is the explanation, then there would seem to be obvious
merit in the few decisions 214 holding that such a public servant
R. Co., (1908) 145 Ill. App. 414; Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Fryar,
(1915) 132 Tenn. 612, 179 S. W. 127, L. R. A. 1916B 791; Kithcart v.
Feldman, (1923) 89 Okla. 276, 215 Pac. 419; Brennan v. Keene, (1921) 237
Mass. 556, 130 N. E. 82, 13 A. L. R. 629; Pincock v. McCoy, (1929) 48
Idaho 227, 281 Pac. 371.
212A fireman who is employed, or who responds to such a call with
no duty to do so, has been held to be an invitee. Clinkscales v. Mundkoski,(Okla. 1938) 79 P. (2d) 562; Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna,(1922) 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S. W. 646. Compare, as to policemen: St. Louis-
San Francisco R. Co. v. Williams, (Okla. 1936) 56 P. (2d) 815; San
Angelo Water, L. & P. Co. v. Anderson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 244 S. W.
571. 213See Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering
His Premises of Their Own Right, (1921) 69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 142, 237, 340;
Note, (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1157.
214Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, (1920) 229 N. Y. 10, 127 N. E.
491, 13 A. L. R. 633 (fireman on driveway); Learoyd v. Godfrey, (1885)
138 Mass. 315 (policeman on walk) ; see Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St.
Corp., (1939) 257 App. Div. 228, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 739; and cf. Toomey v.
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is entitled to protection when he enters upon parts of premises
open at the time to the public. He is a representative of the public;
and while no doubt he does not come for the purpose for which
the place is thrown open, he still may have reason to think that
he is included among those for whom it is provided, and that he
may enter in the expectation of safety. It may be suggested that
a policeman calling during business hours at a store or an office
to make an inquiry should be classed as an "invitee." where if he
comes at midnight, or enters by the fire escape, or in pursuit of a
criminal, he is not.
CONCLUSION
It is surprising how much may sometimes be discovered by
reading the cases. When, in the development of a rule over the
course of a century, the courts have assigned a particular reason
for it, it need not necessarily be concluded that that reason is the
only one, or that it is the right one; but surely it is entitled to re-
spectful consideration, and to some attempt to discover what it
means, and what may lie behind it. By and large the courts have
not talked of business interest or expected financial gain; they
have talked of invitation. Invitation is an unfortunate word, since
it applies equally to the customer who is entitled to protection
and the social -guest who is not. It is unfortunate also in that it
connotes some initiative on the part of the occupier; and one
who is permitted to come in response to his own proposal to do
work on the premises may still expect to be protected. But the
idea which it conveys, of encouragement to enter under circum-
stances which carry an implied assurance of care taken to make the
place safe for the purpose, is essentially sound.
The conclusions which it is hoped may be drawn from the fore-
going discussion are these:
1. In the early cases dealing with the liability of the occupier,
business interest and pecuniary gain had only incidental mention,
and did not affect the decision.
2. The decisions which have turned on the presence or absence
of business interest are few in comparison with the large number
which cannot be accounted for on that basis.
3. When premises are thrown open to the public, the occupier
assumes responsibility for their safe condition toward any mem-
Sanborn, (1888) 146 Mass. 28, 14 N. E. 921. See also the cases cited supra,
note 169. But cf. Wynn v. Sullivan, (1936) 294 Mass. 562, N. E. 236
(policeman in alley).
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ber of the public who may enter for the purpose for which they
are open, regardless of whether he brings with him the hope of
profit or "benefit."
4. When premises are not open to the public, the individual
may still be entitled to protection if he enters under circum-
stances which give him reasonable assurance that care has been
taken to make the place safe for his reception. Visits for the per-
formance of contracts, and for other economic advantage to the
occupier, usually are made upon such implied assurance.
5. When premises are not open to the public, the individual
is not entitled to protection where he does not enter under cir-
cumstances giving him reasonable assurance that the place has
been made safe for him; and this is true whether or not he
confers benefit upon the occupier.
6. The Restatement of the Law of Torts is wrong 1&
215So also, in several particulars, is Prosser, Torts (1941) 626-630,
635-642. To that learned author, a thorough-going reprimand.
